Tales of Monarchs

Interdependence of Autocratic Rule and Minorities in the Middle East and North Africa

Rania Ammsso
Comprehensive Exam
University of San Diego
December 7, 2018
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATA AND HYPOTHESES</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESULTS AND ANALYSIS</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCUSSION</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICY IMPLICATIONS</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES AND FIGURES</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEX</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**ABSTRACT**

What serves as an effective regime in the Middle East and North Africa? Do religious and ethnic minorities and majorities have varying perceptions of political institutions? The greater context of these questions point out a major problem painted more vividly in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings where minorities and majorities are suffering under religious and ethnic persecution by extremist groups. The promotion of democracy in the MENA region has led to chaos and a breeding ground for extremism. This paper aims to show how monarchical tactics toward ethnic and religious groups are more effective than republics. Previous research focuses on the fall of authoritarian regimes during the Arab uprisings and questions the different factors of monarchical stability. Post Arab uprisings, lack of political and social progress within fallen republics reveal that monarchical regimes endure greater social and political pressures than republics. Many authors claim regime strength is derived from oil wealth and loyalty from the military and elites. However, there remains a gap in research where monarchical exceptionalism is highly durable in regions where ethnic and religious divides are most prevalent. Building upon previous research, I aim to understand the role of ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East and North Africa as drivers of transforming or legitimizing political systems. Government satisfaction and democracy suitability serve as my dependent variables, while country, ethnicity and religion are my independent variables. Results support the theory that monarchies are significantly more effective to regions where ethnic and religious groups are most prevalent.

**Keywords:** Middle East, North Africa, minorities, regimes, monarchies, republics, Arab uprisings, democracy

**INTRODUCTION**

**Historic Underpinnings to the Arab Spring**

The year 2011-2012 brought a new wave of thinking about Middle East and North African politics. Across the region, religious and ethnic minorities and majorities chanted slogans referencing a need for political and economical reform. From Jordan to Morocco, protests revealed the many political, economical, and social injustices within republics and monarchies. However, to fully understand how some monarchies and republics withstood or fell under the pressures of demonstrators, historical analysis of fallen monarchies proves to be significant to establishing how ethnic and religious minorities and majorities shaped political and economical systems in the MENA region. First, I aim to focus on how monarchies in the MENA region were formed and the different outcomes of their reigns. Second, I describe existing minorities and majorities and how they are currently affected in each region. The important point to withdraw from this analysis is that monarchies have given audience to minorities and majorities establishing a deep understanding of their countries needs, while legitimizing their power under foreign pressures. Given the task of reigning is not as simply defined, the MENA region historically has flourished economically and remained politically stable under monarchs. Addressing the regime change demands of the Arab Spring sheds light on the need for security and government satisfaction; however, as transitional democracies emerge, many minorities and majorities still face economical and political challenges. Thus, how have monarchies fared with
challenges and are their tactics more suitable to the MENA region? How do ethnic and religious minorities and majorities view their governments?

**Jordan**

Branded a constitutional monarchy under British rule, the Jordanian constitution of 1952 draws out an executive branch consisting of twelve Chamber of Deputies where women and minority groups are represented through a quota system.¹ Six seats are reserved for women, nine seats are reserved for Christians, and three are kept for Chechens and Circassians.¹ In 1956 to 1999, King Hussein banned all political parties and amended election laws to buttress Hashemite strongholds to occlude strong showings of Islamist and Palestinian victories.¹ His strategy inhabited a strong tolerance for political dissent; however, he feared allowing electoral victories to tread too far, plunging the country into chaos.¹ His tactics surrendered to this fear; however, while maintaining respect for all ethnicities and religions, he aimed to keep the peace.¹ His son King Abdullah carried out the same policies and even halting all electoral activities when extremist idealism began to rise. For instance, post September 11th, he suspended parliament for two years, regressing back to rule by command and he appointed local governments instead of those who were elected.¹ This tactic is meant to protect and preserve the rights of Jordanians in parliament from opposition groups that draw upon emotional support of those who are marginalized. By doing this, the king avoids furthering sectarian violence in the Palestinian-Israeli region as well as the spill-over effect into Jordan as seen during the War of 1967.¹ Similarly in 2005 after the bombing in Amman, King Abdullah restricted democratic procedures to focus on fabricating effective security measures.¹ Overall, Jordan maintains neutral domestic and international relations and relies heavily on foreign aid such as oil-wealth.¹ However, the monarch’s priorities remain strongly with gradually progressing political, economical, and social reforms. Currently, refugees from surrounding countries place a strain on the progress of these reforms.

**Tunisia**

Deemed a French protectorate from 1881 to 1956, Tunisia harbored prospects for progress throughout the years.² For instance, France granted Tunisia’s independence in 1956, proclaiming a bey as the central authority.² Under the bey, Tunisian ministers were appointed to maintain the government structure. As stable as the structure seemed to be, it was still met with challenges. However, the way these challenges were addressed is important. For instance, in the 1890’s, a educated group of young French Tunisians proposed modernizing reforms based on European models and greater government participation to the monarch.² Their aim was to disseminate information on other political systems to liberal French compatriots to help Tunisia move more towards modernity, while still under monarchic rule.² From this proposal, the Destour (constitution) Party materialized demanding a constitutional form of government to be established where Tunisians have access to similar rights as Europeans.² The bey Muhammad al-Nasir, greatly accepted the proposal; however, the French government refused to accept and

arrested the leader of the Destour Party. Two years later, the bey demanded the constitution be adopted or else he would abdicate. The French resident overlooking the protectorate, Saint Lucien, withdrew the request and instead restricted the bey’s actions. On 1934, an attorney, Habib Bourguiba, created the Neo-Destour Party to gain mass support against the French. However, the French dissolved the group and Neo-Destour were sent to France in 1939, but released by the Nazis in 1942 as they refused to work with the fascist government in Italy. Empathetic to the Neo-Destour cause, the bey formed a ministry sympathetic to the Destour, eventually leading to the bey’s overthrow. Accused of conspiring with the Nazis by the French in 1951, Bourguiba fled to Egypt. Post World War II sympathies led the French to accept nationalist movements, leading to nationalist guerrillas to operate in 1956, leading Tunisia into chaos. However negotiations in 1956 returned Bourguiba as prime minister and the rule of beys was abolished. A republic was declared in 1957 paving the way for educational, women rights, and legal reforms. Given that economic development was slow, conservative groups opposed the presidency of Ben Salah in 1969 shifting back to Bourguiba’s more authoritarian tactics. As he further suppressed the Islamic Tendency Movement, his long autocratic rule took a toll and created further opposition dissent leading to the Ben Ali presidency of 1987. Islamist political activity progressed and genuine power sharing was left in the shadows. With Ben Ali’s removal, secular and religious divides furthered and tensions between Salafist and Nahda party for Islamic law to be written into the new constitution ensued. Currently, no party is able to form a parliamentary majority, but Tunisia aims to form a unity government.

**Morocco**

Currently a constitutional monarchy with two legislative houses, Morocco historically was established as a French protectorate between 1912-1956. Learning from the Algerian conquest and the Tunisia protectorate, the French approached Morocco with a new perspective of colonial rule post World War I and recognized that Morocco had been independent from Ottoman rule and was highly influenced by Muslim Spain. Given this newfound perspective of the French, political and social reforms were frequently embraced. For instance, King Hassan II encouraged programs of liberalization and enacted new political freedoms and reforms to the constitution began to take place in the 1990’s, such as allowing free and fair elections where opposition parties won the largest bloc of seats in 1997. In 1999, his son Muhammad VI, carried through with reforms, giving women greater access to education, government positions, and expanded marriage rights. However ideal the reforms proved to be for women, many of them feared to exercise their rights due to societal stigma as well as the growing dissent among Islamic groups against these reforms. In 2011, demonstrations called for economic and political reforms, paving the way for the Justice and Development Party (a moderate Islamist group) to win 107 seats of 395 in the parliamentary elections of November 2011.

---

Libya

During the 1920’s, the Italian government led by Benito Mussolini oversaw developments and Italian settlements in Cyrenaica, Libya. In 1942, Italian settlers left the eastern settlements, leaving Libya disadvantaged under remnants of varying political, economic, and religious customs. Given the dire political and economical circumstances, the United Nations Assembly concurred to inaugurate Libya as a united and independent kingdom under King Idris I. In 1952, a constitution creating a federal state with separate parliaments for each province materialized and citizens accepted the monarchy as a better alternative to Italian rule. King Idris I banned all political parties and embraced the increasing oil wealth in 1959. However, the War of 1967 led to his ousting in September 1969 due to his lack of action against Israel. The coup d’état, carried out by Muammar Quaddafi, led to the proclamation of Libya as an official republic. Quaddafi broke ties with Britain and the United States, agitated increasing oil prices through nationalization, and led to increased oppositions as political and economical progress slowed under Quaddafi. International condemnation of violence from the Libyan government and lack of voluntary abdication of the presidency propelled NATO and other international actors to execute hard power. With support from international leaders, the rebel leadership council called Transitional National Council emerged in Benghazi to serve as oversight of fractured Libya. However, civilians lack of trust in the council undermined the effectiveness of any new emerging leadership. Even after the establishment of a national assembly, diverging interests of leading groups furthered the absence of central authority, creating a new breeding ground for extremist militant groups.

Egypt

Granted independence by Britain in 1952, Egypt functioned as a monarchy and a republic under the 1923 constitution, which paved the political and cultural foundations for an independent sovereign state with a bicameral parliament. In 1930, the constitution was replaced to give the king greater executive power; however, significant protesting reinstated the 1923 constitution and the monarchy was abolished in 1952, declaring a Republic of Egypt a year later. President Gamal Abdel Nasser abolished all political parties, which operated freely under the monarchy, instead replaced by the National Union of 1957. In 2011, protests called for a new constitution and overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak. In 2012, a 100-member constituent Assembly paved the way for Islamists parties to claim two thirds majority in legislature causing tensions between Islamists and minority liberal, secular, and Christian coalitions. The victory of the Islamist parties called into question the legitimacy of the role of religion in the state, human rights, and the passing of a legally challenged constitution written by a Muslim majority. President Mohamed Morsi withdrew the constitution in 2013, and was later replaced by President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi due to ramifications of withdrawing the constitution.

Syria

Under the French mandate in 1920, Syrians were guided to develop administrations, resources and prepare for self-rule. Minority groups such as Alawite and Druze were given rightful positions to oversee local governments. However, as claimed by the French, difficulties arose in preparing Syria for self-rule due to the diverging difference between French and Syrian conceptions of what self-rule implied. For example, since the French protected Christian minorities in the Levant, French officers resisted relinquishing control over to Muslim majority. Not only did the French harbor this particular sentiment, but also Christians were not opposed for the French to assist in setting up society while the educated elite requested Syria remain independent and eventually include regions of Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, Alawite and Druze communities.

The first crisis began with the Druze revolt of 1925, where Druze alliance with the People’s Party led to the 1928 elections and eventual formation of the Constituent Assembly. However, from these elections, nationalists took office and drafted a constitution that singled out French assistance. The high commissioner rejected the draft and met further political and social challenges. For example,

**Lebanon**

The French mandate of Lebanon established in 1923 leaned toward Maronite Christian favorability, revealing a distinctly unique political system later established in 1926 under a constitution supporting a multiparty republic with parliamentary governance. Given the French’s favorability towards Christians sparked tensions between religious sects, the mandate provided that each sect would be represented in public office therefore giving rise to the 1989 Ta’if Accord. Parliamentary seats are apportioned equally between Christian and Muslim sects. For instance, the following conditions are followed: a) the president is a Maronite Christian; b) the premier is a Sunni Muslim; c) the speaker of the National Assembly is Shi’ite Muslim. Although, this system seemed to establish fair opportunity among varying religious sects, the problem with the system lies within the cabinet’s legal ability to hold more executive power than the president. The cabinet requires a vote of confidence from the Assembly on governing matters; however, long-term internal discord, societal contention, and foreign state pressures hinder the Assembly from effectively executing policies. Throughout the years, Lebanon aimed to maintain parliamentary democracy, but the problem in implementing power-sharing between Christians and Muslims persisted despite the National Pact of 1943. Three regimes (Khuri 1943-52, Chamoun 1958, and Chehab 1958) all led to the events of the 1970 Civil War. With no central authority in place, sectarian based militants persevered and violence amplified between Maronite Christian and Muslim communities.

**Iraq**

---


After the end of the Ottoman Empire rule in Iraq, the British decided to merge Mosul, Baghdad, and Al-Basrah post World War I. British leaders entertained different ideas of maintaining central authority in Iraq, such as direct control to protect Britain’s interest in the Gulf, or indirect control where ethnic and religious nationalists could conciliate one another. A majority of British officials feared growing dissent towards Britain from Iraqi civilians through direct control, therefore advised the civil commissioner to adopt indirect control with an establishment of an indigenous regime with British oversight. In 1920, the Emir Faysal I in Syria, led the Arab Revolt of 1916 against the Ottomans, faced resistance form the French as he refused to acknowledge the French mandate in Syria and Lebanon, leading to his exile. As Faysal sought advice from London on the matter, Iraqi nationalists sought independence and British public sentiment to withdraw from Iraq increased. Britain proposed Faysal to take reign in Iraq in 1921, however, Faysal proclaimed acceptance of the throne under the condition that the Iraqi people themselves accepted him. The British declared “Faysal king of Iraq, provided that his ‘Government shall be constitutional, representative and democratic.” Most importantly, “Iraq undertook to respect religious freedom and missionary enterprises and the rights of foreigners…” After ratifications of British influence shifted from twenty to four years, the Constituent Assembly adopted modifications in 1924 passing the Organic Law providing a constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary government, and bicameral legislature. However, ten elections led to the downfall of the monarchy in 1958 as diverging interests and power struggles of political parties ensued. Iraqi nationalists describe this conundrum perfectly as having two governments: one foreign and the other national. In 1932, conflicts between political leaders sparked, and the Assyrian uprising of 1933 took place. Assyrians argued that they were given a guarantee of security by Britain and Iraq under the mandate. When the mandate was withdrawn and King Faysal was visiting Europe, opposition groups displayed their power by brutally killing hundreds of Assyrians, creating deeper divisions in Faysal’s cabinet. His son King Ghazi took his place from 1933 to 1939; however, his inexperience led to the competition of political parties to rise, thus leading to more sectarian violence. Fluctuations in military intervention and shifting of governments led to the rise of the Ba’th Party. Post World War II, the monarchy failed to gain public support as older leaders desired to maintain the Baghdad Pact with Britain and oppose the United Arab Republic. Military leaders met in small groups under the name of Free Officers as their main goals were to gain Jordanian forces against threats from Israel. The revolutionary forces led to the downfall of the monarchy in 1958. Although Arabs and Kurds were declared partners in Iraq and Islam became the religion of the state, conflicts arose between commanding officers. For instance, Qasim the lead of the revolution protested Arab unity while Arif his deputy commander promoted pan-Arab cause. Arif was ousted and Qasim’s power was challenged in 1959 by other groups, such as the Ba’th Party, eventually leading to the fall of the republic paving the way for Saddam Hussein’s regime.

To understand the current situation prior and post Arab uprisings within the MENA region, it is significantly important to understand the historical underpinnings of the creation of monarchies by the French and the British. Within these histories, the main takeaway is how the French and the British dealt with monarchs and dealt with nationalist parties proposing more modernized

---

reforms under the existing monarchies. The French dealt with reformists differently than the British, leading to a fairly evident picture of chaos in specific countries. For example, Tunisia has a history of a monarchy ready to embrace modernity while still holding on to rule. However, the French eradicated any reformist idea.

This is the legitimacy created by monarchies. They have a deep understanding of the history of their people through a two-sided story. Presidents elected within Middle Eastern and North African nations come from elected parties, which tend to promote one side of the story.

However, there remains a gap in research where monarchic exceptionalism is highly durable in regions where ethnic and religious divides are most prevalent. Building upon previous research, I aim to understand the role of ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East and North Africa as drivers of transforming or legitimizing political systems. This paper aims to understand the historical background of the affected countries Jordan, Morocco, Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria. Second, concepts of previous research are analyzed to support that monarchical regimes serve as better options than alternative political systems due to treatment of minority and majority groups. Third, comparisons between ethnic and religious group perspectives on government and democracy suitability are tested and analyzed as the results significantly support the revival of monarchic exceptionalism.

THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Given the rich history of monarchic and republic establishments, the current monarchy debate sparked by the repercussions of the Arab Spring serves as the main foundation to exploring most effective political systems in the Middle East and North Africa.

The focus of this literature review aims to bring to light authoritarian regime durability in the Middle East and North Africa region during and after the Arab uprisings. Previous research discusses concepts such as: oil wealth, poverty, education, literacy rates, fertility, and research and development as factors directly affected by type of regime. Other researchers delve into predictability of the Arab uprisings and distinguish between the strength of a monarchy versus a republic. For example, some researchers focused on the way regimes suppressed political dissent among citizens through economic incentives, therefore shielding them from a decline in power. Most researchers argue the outcome of suppressing civilians also suppress rising Islamic parties, therefore further reducing the chances of democratization within the region. Others claim republics that have fallen due to political dissent and prolonged protests lack certain protections regimes have to offer. In the case of post-republic regime rule, civilians remain frustrated and lack genuine leaders due to corrupt election processes. There remains a gap in research regarding whether constitutional monarchies depend on favorability from certain ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic groups to bolster their durability and legitimacy. Another question remains on whether the Jordanian, Moroccan, and Kuwaiti monarchies will eventually answer to the challenges presented by the Arab uprisings. Using previous literature, I aim to understand these concepts more in depth in order to answer the question of whether the Jordanian monarchy will endure greater challenges or if growing favorability will further legitimize the monarchy to rule throughout generations to come.
The groundwork for this type of research is found within Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds’ article, “Why the Modest Harvest?” The success of a campaign to oust the ruler is preconditioned by two factors: 1) oil wealth; and 2) the precedent of hereditary succession. For instance, regimes that lacked major oil revenue and did not have a hereditary succession structure fell to domestic uprisings. Whereas dictators who inherited rule and commanded oil rents had remaining sufficient loyal support. Raymond Hinnebusch expands on the creation of the Middle East due to the great imperialistic influence that dominated the Arab region’s developed “core.” The eventual expansion of capitalism created strong European links to economic and military power, therefore reducing the Middle East to an economic periphery of the core implementing a “very flawed Western-style state system on it” (Hinnebusch, 2015). Hinnebusch argues: 1) the oil boom accelerated Western involvement in Saudi Arabia generating interest and investment partnerships by the ruling family in the oil monarchies; and 2) oil increased security dependency of the gulf oil producers on the west. “Neither Arab nationalism nor Arab oil were able to overcome the legacy of fragmentation and dependency inflicted on the region by the West and neither proved able to restore the Arab world of the Islamic Middle East as a major world power… the Gulf’s ruling families [have] a much greater stake in the core while dividing Arab States between rich and poor” (Hinnebusch, 2015). Anne Brocard and Stephanie Vallet discuss how “rentier states in the Middle East usually have strong, autocratic governments which buy off political dissent by distributing the wealth derived from oil through extensive subsidies and allocations.” Therefore, there is little incentive to increase efficiency in the resource production or to diversify wealth sources.

Looking more into how autocrats buy off political dissent, researcher Tarek Masoud focuses on Egypt and Tunisia’s democratic opening pre-Arab uprisings. The article speculates on the reasons why the military in Egypt did not fully support the regime by forcefully suppressing protestors during the uprisings in 2011. Some researchers claim it was do to personal sentiment towards their counymen, while others believe the military harbored a distaste towards the rise of the NDP. In conclusion, Masoud claims that regime durability merely rests upon the ability to suppress grievances and collective action, therefore making regimes inherently unstable. Masoud agrees that power of an autocrat is determined by money and loyalty where the autocrat can buy off foes and use loyal agents to cause violence. Despots with enough resources and repressive forces will stay in power based on massive inflows of oil rents. Michele Angrist Penner argues overall that decisions made within the period of the Ottoman Empire in the face of imperialism led to a greater nationalistic approach. However, the Ottoman’s considered: 1) adopting European way of innovations and institutions such as military technology, tactics, and

---

political institutions or 2) returning to purified Islam. Penner concludes by defining three possible regime formation outcomes in postimperial Middle East: single-party dictatorships, monarchical dictatorships, and democratic or semidemocratic regimes. Given these structures, problems persisted.

Ceren Belge and Ekrem Karakoc take on another perspective regarding regime type, such as monarchies and republics. They discuss the impact of minorities’ favorability towards monarchies versus republics, where monarchies are highly favored among non-Muslim minority communities, whereas Muslim communities are less favorable towards monarchies. This is due to the fact that electoral systems all for Muslim communities to be represented. Dating back to 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, non-Muslim minorities were granted places in parliament and given a platform for grievances; however, Muslim minorities claim there was no such voice given to them. Therefore, democratic electoral models would serve their representation better than regimes. Given these ethnic and political divisions growing, there are issues remaining in regimes such as monarchies and even republics with elected dictators. Nader Fergany, and Egyptian statistician focuses mainly on poverty, population growth and fertility rates, egalitarian income distribution practices, and the ability of the poor to capitalize on periods of economic growth of 3.3% enabling a trade of their political rights. For example, Fergany states, “a person who is not free is poor. A woman who is not empowered is poor. And a person who has no access to knowledge is poor” (Fergany, 2002). He believes that the educational system is the root of the problem, where people are geared more towards being consumers, rather than producers for their own good.

Marc Lynch responds to the 2002 Arab Human Development Report and how it “ruthlessly” enumerated poverty, education, and political problems in the Middle East. He points out the Human Development Report is obsessed with breaking down the importance of authoritarian states because they are a threat to individual well-being. In Jane Kramer’s article, “The Crusader”, she reveals the true story of Aboudbaker Jamai, a Moroccan journalist who struggled to attempt to highlight Morocco’s insufficient political and social condition and curtailed progression as a constitutional democracy. He directly met with the challenges a constitutional monarchy presents to social and censorship reform. Kramer lists the issues Jamai raises through his journalistic efforts, such as, the view that Morocco’s government is a business run by “cash for favors.” He highlights the royal family’s treatment of civilians, police extortion, lack of refined constitutional democracy, lack of parliament power, the King’s control over the economy, licenses, taxes, suppression of Islamist parties, and the media. With Jamai’s personal experience with the downside of authoritarian regimes at hand, it is clear to see how favorability of monarchic regimes fluctuate and affect the durability of these regimes.

13 See Penner, Michele Angrist. The Making of Middle East Politics. Politics and Society in the Contemporary Middle East. 1-25.
As the literature continues to understand regimes, in this article, Lynch provides a narrative on whether American intervention is needed in the Middle East to force change. However, given the uprisings in 2011, two researchers Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Fahmy Howeidy believe Arab protesters ignited protesting without intervention. The two ideas that were floating amidst elites were that the protests would bring about economic and political reforms, or pave a way for an Islamic Awakening, or create a democratic, cosmopolitan generation. Amr Hamzawy, an Egyptian liberal believes the latter concept, that revolutions were meant to bring about democracy. On the other hand, most researchers side with Burhan Ghalyoun from Syria, claiming it was merely an Arab Awakening: Arabs realizing they have lived under suppressive regimes. Posusney emphasizes the fact that there is a cluster of autocracies in the MENA region and there has not been one single case of a successful democratization. Researchers like Posusney and Penner bring to light a different perspective on the durability of authoritarian states, where their stable political equilibrium has served as an effective survival strategy and future researchers should focus on this particular strength.

The Arab uprisings are described as an awakening where people recognized they have not only individual freedoms, but also political freedoms under regimes. Nora Bensahel explains how the US has a contradictory interest in Middle Eastern reform. In general on a global basis, policy makers would like to see democracy and civic freedoms; however, such developments in the Middle East could undermine US oil interests. Bensahel also explains progressive developments within the MENA region could affect regional stability and security cooperation. In other words, giving political parties and Islamist parties a say in MENA politics could destabilize US security and democratic progress. On the other hand, a gradual reform best suits US short-term interests, while MENA civilians experience perpetual frustrations under authoritarian rule. Bensahel concludes by stating popular frustrations increasing instability within the region are not as likely to cause damage to US interests to a great extent.

Professor Avi Spiegel states that republics are highly vulnerable to uprisings and more open to the potential of democracy, whereas monarchies are highly durable, but have a tendency to fade. Monarchies have provided healthy economies for their citizens versus countries like Egypt and Tunisia have delayed progress in democratization, further frustrating their citizens. In monarchies, elections are not held; however, citizens feel that without elections, their rulers gain legitimacy because they do not have to try to declare victory. Jillian Schwedler discusses the end of monarchical exceptionalism by pointing out how protests erupted in Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain. Schwedler points out two flawed premises regarding monarchical exceptionalism:

---

1) Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait are more tolerant towards political dissent because their authority did not root from electoral elections; and 2) monarchs enjoy legitimacy than republican regimes. As for the second flawed premise, monarchies claim that their authority is based on religious grounds versus elections, therefore through religious provisions, Muslims must accept rulers. Schwedler further questions the legitimacy of this argument by stating “popular expressions of adoration of the ruler are motivated by self-preservation – to fend off the attention of repressive security apparatuses.

As previous research, there has been a great amount of discussion on how the oil boom has affected the perpetual investment of royal family’s and how those rentier states lack the ability to progress socially and politically without risking their oil-based economy. Researchers like Brownlee, Hinnebusch, Brocard, and Masoud all provide a historical and contemporary background for understanding the economical affect of oil on authoritarian regimes. Gaps in research remain regarding how minorities are supported by regimes and how the constitutional monarchies protect those minorities. I would like to further investigate this gap in research and show the significance of ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic groups in the Middle East using research provided by Belge, Posusney, Speigel, and Schwedler.

Monarchy Debate


RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

My hypothesis is that since religious and ethnic minorities are protected by monarchic regimes, then those minorities will hinder democratic progression and will continue to support monarchic regimes. I will validate this hypothesis by showing how ethnic and religious minorities and majorities differ in their perspectives regarding trust in government, democracy suitability, freedom of expression, reasons of the Arab Spring, economic progression, and security. I use these measures to look beyond individual perspectives throughout history and how reform is most likely guaranteed through authoritarian regimes than republics.

The research question is supported by data on fifteen Middle Eastern and North African countries using the unit of analysis of individual perspectives. The research design is consisted of an index of variables provided by the Arab Barometer’s third wave (2012-2014). Experts who contribute to the Arab Barometer conducted thirty-six national surveys over four waves before and after the Arab Uprisings. Experts implemented 45,000 interviews in fifteen countries. They include populations in governates living in both rural and urban areas. Researchers also exclude small populations (<0.2%) in remote areas. The unit of analysis provided is individual responses from a randomly selected household within specified cities. The sample size is 1,200 with additional samples of 300 Syrian refugees. The sampling strategy is stratified sampling by governate settlement type of primary sampling units (PSU) and probability proportional by size (PPS).

I test my hypothesis using the Arab Barometer’s cross-national survey statistical analysis for only eight out of the twelve countries they tested. I will focus particularly on Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Iraq. My case selection refers to the ethnic and religious groups in each country and their experiences under regime types. However, the countries and groupings vary in terms of history, democratic progress, regime type, and economics. I will examine the presence and role of secularization practices and the role of religion in politics. I anticipate varying perspectives on government, economics, freedom of expression, and security in republics while I expect less variation under monarchic regimes as well as successful transitional democracies such as Tunisia.

The data provides varying demographics of the participants helping secure the foundation of my main argument, which speculates minorities that feel satisfied with their current government will further contribute to the longevity of monarchic regimes. Also, minorities who are currently experiencing marginalization from transitions to republic systems will also oppose democratic progress. These demographics provide a backdrop to examine mass public opinion within
minority communities against majority communities. Majority opinions will prove important to test internal and external validity.

First, I compare mean differences of my independent and dependent variables through boxplotting and t-testing, which tests the hypothesis by comparing means of variables to show a central tendency or variation in perspectives. I also use cross-tabs for non-continuous, categorical variables to produce side-by-side frequency distributions of the dependent variable (one for each category of the independent variable) and overall frequency distributions.

Second, I use a regression to show which independent variable affects the dependent variable most. From this test, I can extract which independent variable negatively or positively impact the dependent variable. This process will lead me to make the inference of whether the relationship is additive or interactive. I expect the relationship to portray an interactive relationship.

DATA AND HYPOTHESES

The appropriate method to make comparisons depends on the level of measurement of the independent variables and dependent variables. There are two possible measures: 1) the independent and dependent variable are categorical (nominal or ordinal); and 2) the independent variable is categorical and the dependent variable is interval.

For this study in particular, I will be using the former option, as both my independent and dependent variables are of categorical composition. Within the cross-tabulations, the hypothesis will be tested by comparing the percentage of subjects who fall into the same category of the dependent variable.

My independent variables describe the demographics of individuals in the MENA region, particularly three ethnicities, two major religions, and eight countries. My dependent variables are described through interval scaling of how democracy, government satisfaction, security, freedom of expression, and Arab Spring reasons are perceived by the independent variables of individual demographics.

According to the Minority Rights Group, demographics in each of the tested eight countries are as follows:

**Jordan**

Jordan is composed of 92% Sunni Muslim, 6% Christian, and 2% Shia and Druze.23 Ethnic groups consist of Bedouins, Iraqis, Chechens and Circassians, Baha’i, Kurds, and Assyrians. Christians and Palestinians make up 6% of the population. Christian sects are comprised of

---

Greek Orthodox and Armenians. The Jordanian government is tolerant of Christian minorities where they are allowed to worship publicly. Those who convert to Islam are not recognized by the government, but are recognized legally as Muslims for property and family law reasons. The 1952 constitution reserves 9 out of 110 seats for Christians in the Chamber of Deputies creating a fair amount of overrepresentation in parliament. They also compose a large portion of senior ranks within the military and finance sector. Palestinians are represented in government with restrictions due to the political and religious radical tendencies rooting from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

**Morocco**

Ethnic and religious groups in Morocco mainly consist of 40% to 60% Berbers and only .01% Jews. The Berber population post-independence remains well represented in the Moroccan army and less in government. Currently, Berber language competes with Arabic as the official language in the region. Saharawis are a mix of Berber, African and Arab descent. They have their own law called A’arf, which aligns village leadership with Shari’a law. Mineral resource discoveries shift economic opportunities in Morocco, pushing modernization of the Saharawi society in the 1960’s and 1970’s. However, Saharwais have resisted partitions of the Western Sahara in 1976, but without the ability to vote in referendums due to their nomadic nature, Saharwais remain less politically influential.

**Tunisia**

Minority groups in Tunisia are considered those of Berber, Jewish, and Baha’i origins. The Baha’i faith is restricted from public worship within a community of 200. The Berbers of Tunisia are currently fighting to coin Tamazight as an official language, adopt new secular and democratic values within the newly drafted constitution, and consistently emphasize their lack of freedom of expression.

**Libya**

The main minority groups are Imazighen estimated at 4% to 10% and Tuareg at .03%. The main religion is Sunni Islam and a majority is of Arab or Berber descent. After the fall of Gaddafi, armed groups loyal to ISIS have been targeting groups such as Coptic, Ethiopian, and Eritrean Christians.

**Egypt**

The main groups consist of 6% to 9% Coptics, 0.25% Nubians, 2,000 to 3,000 Baha’i, and fewer than 30 Jews. Other minorities are Sufi Muslims, Jehova’s Witnesses, Ahmadis, Quranists, and Shi’a. The two main religions are Coptic Christian and Islam. Under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s government, there have been accounts of human rights abuses and further divides propelled by the government failure to address inter-communal conflicts. Empty promises to reconstruct destroyed places of worship further amplify the Sisi government’s negligence of minority rights. Sectarian violence and conflict is promoted by state attempts to restrict majoritarian practices of Sunni Islam, restricting Shi’a practices (as proclaimed a national security threat), and under
Article 64 of the 2014 Constitution, only Abrahamic faiths are allotted freedom of religion. Others such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Baha’i refrain from public practice. Those of Nubian ethnicity are consistently attacked by officials white protesting land ownership in 2017 to voice concerns over Presidential Decrees 355 and 498, which confiscated 1,100 acres of land and evicted Nubians. The Jewish community remains stigmatized by historical occurrences leading to the dissolution of ill-funded synagogues and a rapidly declining population.

**Syria**

Syria’s minority groups consist of Alawi, Christians, Armenians, Assyrians, Druze, Isma’ili Shias, Kurds, and Palestinians ethnicities and religions. Specifically, 12% are Alawite Islam (2% Isma’ili), 10% Christian (Greek Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, Maronite, Syrian Catholic, Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic), 3-4% Druze, 1% Yezidi. All minority groups are subject to the sectarian violence of the Civil War since 2011. A count made in 2018 claims 6.6 million are internally displaced while 5.6 million are refugees in surrounding countries.

**Lebanon**

The main groups in Lebanon consist of 6.4-7.7% of Palestinians, 6% Druze, 4% Armenian, and 0.6% Kurds. The main religions are 28% Sunni Islam, 28% Shia Islam, 22% Maronite Christian, 8% Greek Orthodox, 6% Druze, and 4% Greek Catholic. There is no dominant or minority group. The Orthodox and Catholic communities often clash based on the Russian rivalry for a Greater Syria. Orthodox Christians support the idea of Arab nationalism since the idea could land them a greater role in politics. Armenians, estimated at 150,000, fled harassment from the Armenian Orthodox Church and the attacks by the Turks in 1895-1896 and the genocide of 1915. Alawite Muslims are estimated at 100,000 after the Syrian intervention in 1976. Kurds are estimated at 25,000, but are not involved in politics along with Palestinians as both groups lack civil rights.

**Iraq**

99% of Iraqis are Muslim (60% are Shi’a and 32-27% are Sunni). Before ISIS led attacks, there were 350,000 Christians, 500,000 Yezidis, 200,000 Kaka’i, and a small group of Sabean-Mandaean and Baha’i. There are 75-80 % Arabs, 15-20 Kurds, and a small group of Turkmen, Shabak, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Armenians, and Roma.

The following hypotheses regarding democracy will be tested as follows: 1) In a comparison of ethnicities, Assyrians are more likely to view democracy as less suitable than those of Kurdish and Arab ethnicity; and 2) In a comparison of religion, Christians are more likely to view democracy as less suitable than Muslims.

Given the specific demographics of the eight tested countries, the following hypotheses regarding government satisfaction, democracy suitability, freedom of expression, economy, and Arab Spring reasons will be tested as follows:
In a comparison of ethnicities, Assyrians and Kurds are more likely to dissatisfied with the government than those of Arab ethnicity; and 2) In a comparison of religion, Christians are more likely to be dissatisfied with the government than Muslims.

Considering whether the hypothesis has merit, I will analyze the tendency of the relationship and apply the non-statistical measure of the relationships strength. For instance, using an uncontrolled comparison to determine the tendency and strength of the independent and dependent variable before the control is introduced. For instance, the hypothesis will be valid if the dependent variable has increasing values while the independent variable increases, denoting a negative relationship. The tendency will be positive when the independent variable increases, and dependent increases.

In order to measure the strength, I will have to calculate the percentage-point change in the dv across the full rant of the iv. What factors besides might account for differing opinions on ? Regardless of (besides) people with less.

I will need to control for the by holding it constant by using a cross-tabulation with a control layer.

After running the cross-tabulation with a control layer, the result came to show a negative/positive relationship between the control variable and the dependent variable. Comparing the opinions of people who share the same independent variable but differ on control shows . When there is a drop in percentage points between the two categories of the control variable, this is called the “” effect of about points.

Next, I examine if a spurious relationship exists between the iv and control. Is this an additive relationship where the iv and control are helping to explain the dv? Or is there an interaction? If the dependent variable and independent variable relationship is spurious, then the relation will weaken after adding the control variable. The independent variable would not play a role in explaining then dependent variable because the relation persists after controlling for therefore I cannot rule out the spuriousness.

In an additive relationship, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is the same or quite similar for each value of the control variable. By contrast, in an interactive relationship, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable varies in tendency or strength for different values of the control variable. The dependent and independent variable relationship has the same tendency where it runs in the same direction for both categories of the control, showing similar strength. Therefore, with the same tendency and the same strength, the relationship will be additive than interactive. Whereas in an interactive relationship there is same tendency with different strengths.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Convince the reader something interesting is happening (what are the tendencies of key variables, mean, median, skew?,
Does a control look like it might be interfering
How should readers interpret the charts
Inferential results – remind reader of hypotheses and how you tested them, help reader understand any tables (state alpha level, effect sizes, confidence intervals, and practical significance)

ANALYSIS (INCLUDING TABLES)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
BIVARIATE COMPARISONS
CONTROLLED COMPARISONS

As shown by Figure 1, within the controlled comparison cross-tabulation, the results show that the Kurdish ethnicity is more likely to view democracy as not suitable while they both trust and do not trust the government. Both the Arab and Assyrian ethnicities are also less likely to view democracy as suitable as trust toward their government declines. This is the most significant graph because the way the control variable interacts with the democracy variable shows the root of ethnic conflict.

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

DISCUSSION
The problem I attempt to highlight acknowledges the historic struggle for minorities to gain civic rights while suggesting that monarchic regimes may be the best-suited political system for the Middle East and North African region. I make this claim based off of qualitative and quantitative evidence where many scholars have argued the importance of recognizing ethnic and religious minorities within the MENA region to reduce tribal tensions, therefore reducing social unrest. However, many other scholars argue the promotion of democracy within the MENA region will allow minorities to foster greater representation within their communities and benefit equally from domestic and international markets. Although, current events post-Arab uprisings have shown significant fluctuations in both of these concepts, I disagree with the latter claim for three
reasons. First, since the conception of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, monarchies were established accordingly to maintain order and stability between ethnic majorities and minorities. Under the Ottoman Empire’s practice of secularization, monarchies maintained the status quo of respect towards majority and minority religions by providing protection and rights. However, many of these rights and protections were limited to Muslim communities due to fear of challenges to the state. Rooting from this oppression, Muslim political parties and majorities are now challengers to regimes post-Arab uprisings, therefore hindering democratic progress. Second, non-Muslim communities have greater representation and protection under monarchic regimes; however, given free and fair elections, the rise of Islamist parties have squeezed out mainly religious and some ethnic minorities from the MENA region, furthering their own dominance and disregard to equality established by the historic status quo. Third, the establishment of democracy within the MENA region could potentially remain incomplete due to ethnic and religious divisions. Although, some regimes were repressive towards majority communities and specific minority communities, perhaps the Arab Uprisings were prompted by the need for change within this particular aspect of equality among Muslim and non-Muslim communities under strong authoritarian leadership. My hypothesis is that since religious and ethnic minorities are protected by monarchic regimes, then those minorities will hinder democratic progression and support monarchic regimes.

Using secondary data provided by Arab Barometer Wave III (2012-2014), I compare the percentages of individuals’ perspectives on government involving trust in government, democratic suitability, and equal rights for minorities in Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. The cross-tabulation testing shows how individual demographics affect perspectives on democracy, government satisfaction, and equality among religions. The most valuable relationship created through my cross-tabulation testing is under the ethnicity category. There is great variance between the ethnicities provided, which are Arabs, Kurds, and Assyrian. Assyrians, who are of Christian faith, tend to support democracy and government less than the Kurds and Arabs. In relation to this decline of support, when religion is tested against democracy and government satisfaction, Christians again are less likely to support democracy and show satisfaction with government. This is significant because Christians are becoming less prevalent within the Middle East due transitioning political systems post-Arab uprisings. There are greater incidences of emigration of Christians than Muslims. This poses a problem for policymakers, especially regimes formed by minorities, because they require the support of Christian minorities and have reserved seats within parliament for those specific religious and ethnic minorities. Without a balance between religions and ethnic minorities within the MENA region, conflict will persist and transitional governments may fail.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

Trust in government has impacted the relationship between the independent and dependent variables specifically regarding democracy suitability and government satisfaction, more than equality between non-Muslims and Muslims. Policy-makers would be able to contribute more positively to the MENA region by taking into consideration that ethnic and religious minorities should be involved equally in politics because the greater variance within the government composition the more trust citizens will have in their government. Overall, trust in government is the main variable in my study that impacts the relationship between the independent and
dependent variable. As shown through Jason Brownlee’s analysis, hereditary regimes that have established familial dynasticism are more likely to be trusted than governments that are elected. Those who are elected may represent a majority religion or ethnicity to a great extent, overshadowing the needs of others equally, eventually squeezing them out of the system. This causes masses of individuals to leave their country, as seen in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS (1) main findings 2) describe results, findings consistent with the work of previous researchers, does your analysis lend support to one scholarly perspective as opposed to another, 3) provide suggestions for further research, methodological probs, discuss new issues

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY

NEW ISSUES OR QUESTIONS

REFERENCES

Scholarly Journals


**Online Periodical Sources**


**Scholarly Books**


**TABLES AND FIGURES**

Tables – always have a heading of table number followed by title

Figures - always have a heading of figure number followed by titles

The title should be clear:

- Comparisons of means of incidence of war by region
- Cross-tabulation of party ID and likelihood

![Graph showing the Reasons for the Arab Spring](image-url)
Figure 1
Boxplot across countries of focus on reasons for arab spring.
0 – missing, 1 – civil/political, 2 – better economic situation, 3 – fighting corruption, 4 – weakening political and economical connections with West, 5 – weakening connections with Israel, 6 – increased social justice, 7 – law, 8 – dignity, 9 – social justice
Figure 2

![Economic Situation Chart](image1)

Figure 3

![Economic Situation Chart](image2)

Figure 4

![Economic Situation Chart](image3)
Figure 5

Evaluate the Current Economic Situation (2012 - 2014)

Freedom to express (1 - yes, 4 - no)

Figure 6

Extent Freedom to Express Opinions is Guaranteed

Freedom to express opinions (1 - yes, 4 - no)
Figure 7
Freedom to Express Opinions

Figure 8
Extent of Satisfaction with the Government
(0- not satisfied, 10 – satisfied)
Figure 9

Satisfaction with the Government

Figure 10

Extent to which Democracy is Suitable for your Country
Figure 11

### Extent to which Democracy is Suitable for your Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Kurdish</th>
<th>Assyrian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent to which democracy is suitable for your country (0-not, 10-suitable)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>36.101</td>
<td>3.465</td>
<td>229.928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Difference</td>
<td>4.665</td>
<td>4.465</td>
<td>8.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error Difference</td>
<td>1.584</td>
<td>1.585</td>
<td>1.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</td>
<td>Lower: 2.210, Upper: 7.120</td>
<td>Lower: 1.010, Upper: 7.550</td>
<td>Lower: 3.020, Upper: 10.050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Difference of the Mean Between Ethnicities

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent to which democracy is suitable for your country (0-not, 10-suitable)</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>36.101</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.465</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish/ Assyrian</td>
<td>3.465</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>4.665</td>
<td>1.584</td>
<td>1.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assyrian</td>
<td>229.928</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>8.015</td>
<td>1.585</td>
<td>1.585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Difference in Means Between Muslims and Christians

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent to which democracy is suitable for your country (0-not, 10-suitable)</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>52.384</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4.721</td>
<td>14789</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>7.614</td>
<td>728.039</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4.312</td>
<td>.593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of your satisfaction with the government (0-not, 10-satisfied)</td>
<td>9.334</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>5.138</td>
<td>14789</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>6.433</td>
<td>603.121</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.812</td>
<td>.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>2.502</td>
<td>3.528</td>
<td>.281</td>
<td>2.648</td>
<td>4.975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Muslims view democracy suitability similarly to Kurds and Assyrians.
b. Arabs view government satisfaction significantly different from Kurds and Assyrians.

difference.

### Difference of the Mean Between Ethnicities

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent to which democracy is suitable for your country (0-not, 10-suitable)</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>36.101</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.465</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish/ Assyrian</td>
<td>3.465</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>4.665</td>
<td>1.584</td>
<td>1.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assyrian</td>
<td>229.928</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>8.015</td>
<td>1.585</td>
<td>1.585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Difference in Means Between Muslims and Christians

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent to which democracy is suitable for your country (0-not, 10-suitable)</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>52.384</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4.721</td>
<td>14789</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>7.614</td>
<td>728.039</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4.312</td>
<td>.593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of your satisfaction with the government (0-not, 10-satisfied)</td>
<td>9.334</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>5.138</td>
<td>14789</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>6.433</td>
<td>603.121</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.812</td>
<td>.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>2.502</td>
<td>3.528</td>
<td>.281</td>
<td>2.648</td>
<td>4.975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Christians gave a lower rating of democracy suitability than Muslims.
b. Christians gave a lower rating of government satisfaction than Muslims.
### Difference in Mean Between Monarchies and Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Evaluation of Economic Situation (2012-2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monarchy</strong></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq</strong></td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordan</strong></td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Libya</strong></td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco</strong></td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tunisia</strong></td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Mean Difference</th>
<th>Std Error Difference</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-9.802</td>
<td>5511.144</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>-2.88</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>[-3.38, -1.90]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### t-test for Equality of Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Mean Difference</th>
<th>Std Error Difference</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>8.384</td>
<td>3,872</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.182</td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>2.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>3,988</td>
<td>5477.309</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.182</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>2.374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Extent do you think democracy is appropriate for your country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Mean Difference</th>
<th>Std Error Difference</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>59.398</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-2.596</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>-1.302</td>
<td>.502</td>
<td>[-2.245, -1.319]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Variable Coding and Recoding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Original Code</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Recode</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>q101</td>
<td>0=miss, 1-9</td>
<td>(good-bad)</td>
<td>Evaluate economic situation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q204.2</td>
<td>0=miss, 1-4</td>
<td>(good-bad)</td>
<td>Employment opportunities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q512</td>
<td>10-0 (appropriate – not appropriate)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic suitability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q513</td>
<td>10-0 (satisfying – not satisfying)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Government satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q811</td>
<td>1-10, nominal values</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab Spring reasons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q606.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious influence in Politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q521.1</td>
<td>1-4 (yes-no)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom of expression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Original Code</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Recode</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>country</td>
<td>Algeria, Egypt Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen</td>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q2001.ir</td>
<td>Arab, Kurdish, Assyrian</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Arab, Kurdish, Assyrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q1012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>