HEZBOLLAH
&
THE CRIME-TEERROR NEXUS

Why the Party of God Got Involved in organized crime

ABSTRACT
Recently, the Lebanon-based and Iranian-backed international terrorist group Hezbollah became involved in global crime. This paper will investigate the conditions Hezbollah needed to transcend their previous Shiite-militant based stronghold in the Middle East to create cooperative relationships with Mexican and South American criminal cartels (among Hezbollah’s worldwide criminal activities). I argue Hezbollah’s path to combine crime, drugs, and terror was deliberate; and the convergence between these variables is observable. Two hypotheses are tested to substantiate Hezbollah’s crime-terror nexus trend. Future international terrorist organizations, not just Hezbollah, may take a similar course-of-action to guarantee their survival, influence, and execution of terrorist attacks.

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Image 1. The caption depicting Hezbollah's official flag reads: And however takes Allah and His Apostle and those who then, believe for a guardian surely the party of Allah are they that shall be triumphant.
Introduction – Hezbollah and the Crime-Terror Nexus

My capstone study examines Hezbollah and focuses on why the international terrorist organization implemented extensive criminal activities into the 21st century. Criminal behaviors are what characterizes Organized Crime Groups (OCGs), and Hezbollah is inculcating these unlawful actions into its infrastructure. OCGs defy the rule-of-law, like Hezbollah, and both share similar operational protocols. On terrorist organizations, according to Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin in The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda, there are three general components of terrorism, “(1) the use of violence; (2) political objective; and (3) the intention of sowing fear in a target population.” 1 Hezbollah was registered as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. State Department on 8 October 1997, and has functioned as an FTO since its inception in the 1980s.2 However, Hezbollah’s status as a FTO is interpreted differently depending on who you ask because it is also labeled a militant political movement which, coincidentally, utilizes acts of terrorism to advance its cause.3 The problem with Hezbollah is that it can defy a conventional definition of terrorism depending on the interpretation. The academically accepted term Transnational Terrorist Organizations (TTO) will be used to differentiate between Hezbollah’s terrorist acts and their criminal activities (i.e. like OCGs).

Background – Understanding the Crime-Terror Nexus

Contemporarily, the association between TTOs and OCGs is often referred to by expressions like the “crime-terror nexus,” the “crime-terror continuum,” “threat convergence,” and “narcoterrorism.” This particular threat has remained relevant into the 21st century. Academic studies and counterterrorism experts are continually addressing this alarming trend. One clear area of agreement, noted by several scholars, is the connection between terrorist organizations and drug trafficking. For example, Moses Naim’s Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy explains how TTOs and OCGs converged because of globalization, which then created a nefarious network of individuals specializing in illicit tradecraft:

Behind this political ascendancy of global criminal networks is a dynamic of globalization that is powerful, yet unusually overlooked. That dynamic is the theme of this chapter. It is how the changes of the 1990s did not just empower criminals but at the very same time weakened the agencies in charge of fighting them. Criminal networks thrive on international mobility and their ability to take advantage of the opportunities that flow from the separation of marketplaces into sovereign states with borders (Naim 2006, 13).4

Amongst policy analysts, Congressional committees convened to better understand the hybridization between crime and terror. Take for example a 2003 joint-interagency Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Research Division report titled Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism specifically commissioned to study the fusion between crime and terror within multiple regions including: Africa, the former Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) and
Eastern Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, Turkey, and the Western Hemisphere. Next, in a 2010 Congressional Research Service report titled *International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress*, the policy analysts explicitly focused on OCGs which willingly fused into TTOs’ operations. Among academic literature, a 2005 International Studies Review article *Nonstate Actors, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction* dedicated a comprehensive analysis of this particular crime-and-terror hybridization subject amongst multiple authors in order to understand the likelihood TTOs can potentially acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Another concept arising out of this crime-terror nexus literature is an activity called narcoterrorism. Narcoterrorism, a term as used by policymakers and law enforcement personnel, described the overlap between drug trafficking and organized crime. Widespread use of the term narcoterrorism first arose in reference to Colombian crime organizations and guerilla movements in the 1980s/1990s. Narcoterrorism, as a Drug War phenomenon, grew out of Colombia’s political institutions becoming coerced and intimidated by cocaine cartels.

Understanding the ability for a TTO to integrate crime-terror nexus tactics is critical. This is because different approaches are required to dismantle a TTO which uses criminal activities as part of its infrastructure. Hezbollah is a relevant example because, even though it is an iconic Iranian and Shiite-Islamist motivated TTO, their recent forays into OCG activities provides an excellent contemporary case-study as to why we have begun to see the merging of crime and terror. The interaction between TTOs and OCGs is not as diametrically construed as could be argued. In Tamara Makarenko’s *The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism*, she analyzes that since the end of the Cold War the association between OCGs and TTOs has not only increased, but their operations have seemingly overlapped due to the change in existential threats since the 1990s. Makarenko corroborated this hypothesis with the “Crime Terror Continuum” displaying how OCGs and TTOs overlap on a sliding-scale. OCG and TTO activities converge on the following conditions: (1) alliance with a terrorist group, (2) use of terror tactics for operational purposes, (3) political crime, (4) ‘black hole’ syndrome, (3) commercial terrorism, (2) criminal activities for operational purposes, and (1) alliance with a criminal organization (*Figure 2*). The practice of this crime-terror hybridization, as a TTO/OCG methodology, will be illustrated as an activity Hezbollah has successfully fulfilled.
Research Question: *Why the case of Hezbollah in the crime-terror nexus?*

Hezbollah is the primary case-study because it has been an Iranian-backed and Shiite-Islam stalwart TTO since the 1980s which transformed to assimilating OCG activities since the 1990s/2000s. Hezbollah has made it no secret that it receives state-sponsorship from Iran, and that Iran is pivotal in supporting Hezbollah logistically and militarily; especially in the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Israel. Understanding the role of Iran is tremendously important as Hezbollah was extremely reliant on state-sponsored funding since its founding in 1982. Yet, following the 1979 seizure of a U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the reestablishment of the Ayatollah’s theocratic regime, Iran has faced numerous international sanctions and embargos. The role of Shiite-Islam, Iran, and the geopolitics of the Middle East are exceptionally important conditions effecting Hezbollah’s evolution since the 1980s. Both Iran and Hezbollah have faced dynamic multilateral efforts meant to restrict state-sponsorship. The U.S. Department of State website lists the numerous international sanctions instituted for decades, to include United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), and is just now releasing the referendums agreed upon as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These previous international coercive diplomatic efforts prevented Iran from researching nuclear weaponry and from logistically and financially supporting Hezbollah. Now, with Iran’s agreement to stop researching nuclear weapons for a period of time, decades worth of sanctioned investments and trade embargoes are lifted. There have been enough significant regional and global changes within the past decades which makes Hezbollah an intriguing organization to analyze because it has endured through these Middle East-centric and worldwide events. The capability for a TTO to endure and display tenacity through these decades demonstrates it has a strong structural foundation. Therefore, the more difficulties the TTO can overcome, then the more robust it becomes. Also, understanding the fundamental shift in the terror-to-crime strategy requires scrutiny because of the dynamic and amorphous nature of both TTOs and OCGs. Lastly, the combination between drugs and terrorism is mutually inclusive because both activities increase the tangible/intangible material wealth and ideological influence of a TTO using a criminal model.

Researching Hezbollah’s links to criminal cartels is important because the strategic dynamic between the War on Drugs and the Global War on Terrorism effects policy agendas. The business relationships a TTO develops with a OCG does not just spring-up overnight. This is considering the drug trade is a major international market estimated in earning hundreds of billions annually. Establishing this underground market corridor takes patience, persistence, and an appreciation of covert procedures. Hezbollah is unpredictable for this reason because it puts the defense, intelligence, and law enforcement bureaucracies in a dilemma. How the U.S. Intelligence Community, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Homeland Security, etc. determine a TTO’s activities directly effects why the aforementioned U.S. federal agencies intervene against an identified TTO. These efforts mirror adaptations found in contemporary TTO literature. Particularly, *jihadist*-based TTOs are incorporating Western-style business models into their organizations such as what was recommended in the *Management of Barbarism* (2004). Again, why TTOs adopt a criminal-model requires research. Survivability is the measurable characteristic of a TTO/OCG, and this is the decision-point the U.S. government’s course-of-action spectrum scrutinizes in a counter-TTO/OCG policy. Policy options include selecting economic sanctions against TTO/OCG harboring states, coercive diplomacy, and/or military intervention. For instance, the balance-of-power significantly
changed towards the end of the Cold War and into the 21st century. Globally, nation-states shifted their behavior to adapt in a world where bipolar power alignment was not strictly dictated between the Communist-led U.S.S.R. and the Western-led U.S. Likewise, the international perception of terrorism significantly changed in the latter half of the 20th century. Terrorism itself, even though it has existed as either a nonstate or state-directed tactic for centuries, geographically adjusted to these multipolar balance-of-power shifts. The last time terrorism had got so much attention was toward the end of the 19th century when anarchists started using bombs to incite political violence. Therefore, the U.S. cannot overlook when a TTO alters its operational structure because that could be the difference between a complex September 11th, 2001 type-attack or a coordinated small-arms style attack like what occurred in San Bernardino, California and in Paris, France (both at the Charlie Hebdo offices and on November 13th, 2015). U.S. relations with Iran and Lebanon may also affect Hezbollah’s current crime-terror behaviors due to their aforementioned history of state-sponsorship. Previous sanctions have been extremely detrimental to Iran’s economic development. The U.S. trusting Iran’s lifted $100 billion, in previously frozen assets, does not go to Hezbollah recognizes Iran as a rational-actor in the international community. Iran’s oil exports were reduced and the country is now allowed to trade internationally again so long as it adheres to the UNSCR and provisions of the JCPOA. This also signals to Hezbollah that Iranian sponsorship may or may not fluctuate as much as in the past since Iran is currently recovering from a recession. Yet, Hezbollah has prepared for circumstances in exigency by incorporating OCG schemes. Iranian state-funding has always been under the inquiry of the international community since 1979. Carefully articulating an effective counter-Hezbollah/TTO policy means policymakers have to incorporate many agencies and agree on the administrative teamwork necessary to deter a TTO’s contingency relations with an OCG. Bilateral and multilateral responses could explain the prescriptive approach Hezbollah undertook to evolve into using criminal techniques. Towards the end of the 20th century, TTOs began to rapidly cross nation-state boundaries and diffuse their ideological message and attacks at a much more alarming rate. The September 11th, 2001 attacks, interim global TTO attacks (2001-current), and the recent Islamic State motivated attacks ushered in a realization these TTOs are capable of spectacular wide-scale operations not localized to a singular region. Here, the volatile ingredient to the mix is the drug-market which
provides an open-door to gain increased revenue for financing these terror acts. Knowing when, where, why, and how a TTO alters its operational structure is of premier importance to the U.S.’s law enforcement, intelligence, and defense apparatus.

Testing The TTO/OCG Issues with Hezbollah

• Theory Research Question:
  o Why has Hezbollah turned to organized criminal activities?

• Unlawful Undertakings (Dependent Variables – illicit drugs & illegal activity) →
  o Hezbollah’s TTO/OCG Hybridization (Independent Variable) = Crime-Terror Nexus

• Main Hypotheses:
  o (1) Globalization Hypothesis – Globalization makes terror-crime fusion possible and therefore leads to a blurring of the line between TTOs and OCGs. This is the telescope hypothesis by which globalization facilitates Hezbollah integrating criminal activities.
  o (2) Survival Hypothesis – Movement of terrorist organizations into criminal activities is a result of rational necessity. This is the microscope hypothesis and explains Hezbollah as a rational-actor by extension of their dependent relationship with Iran.

• Control/Intervening Variables:
  o OCG opportunities and TTO activities adjacent to Hezbollah’s geographic location(s).

• Research Plan – How:
  o Dichotomous Analysis testing the Two Hypotheses:
    The reason this research paper dichotomously separates Hezbollah from TTO and OCG activities is for defining each hypothesis prior to the final crime-terror nexus analysis. By the

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**IRAN’S OIL EXPORTS**

- **2011 AVERAGE**
  - EUROPEAN UNION
  - CHINA
  - JAPAN
  - INDIA
  - SOUTH KOREA
  - TURKEY
  - OTHER: 2.5 million barrels per day

- **AVERAGE SINCE JOINT PLAN OF ACTION (November 2013)**
  - CHINA
  - JAPAN
  - INDIA
  - SOUTH KOREA
  - TURKEY
  - OTHER: 1.1 million barrels per day

Source: Congressional Research Service  Credit: Zachary Lush, Julia Ro

*Figure 3. From the Council of Foreign Relations.*
final analysis, Hezbollah coalesces the two TTO/OCG functions operatively. That is why the
final analysis explains the previous two hypotheses findings. Both hypotheses are individually
extrapolated and demonstrate why Hezbollah transcended into fusing criminal behaviors. This is
why two compounding hypotheses are sequentially explained. Multiple intervening factors have
influenced this transformation, and my intent is to justify why these geopolitical conditions
benefited Hezbollah. Again, survival necessitates an organization’s conversion, and in
Hezbollah’s case, crime is an extremely lucrative method. For example, as recently as 2016, the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) busted an international network between South
American drugs cartels and Hezbollah established to smuggle drugs, money, and weapons with
speculation this network was used to fund Shiite fighters in Syria.18

  (i) Quantitative and Qualitative Methods:

Hezbollah has evolved to hybridized criminal opportunities during a complex global
state-of-affairs. Empirically, select data-sets are intended to connect-the-dots as to why
Hezbollah is shifting its methodologies for increased financial revenue. Identifying quantitative
data-sets posed some difficulty given that criminal activities and terror networks remain hidden.
Nonetheless, the data-sets annotated are from the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database, and from MicroCase. Sources
cited are from academic and media articles. Each hypothesis uses content analysis based on the
sources. Finally, Hezbollah has been studied for many decades so locating expert
counterterrorism articles was not an issue.

• (1) Globalization Hypothesis – Globalization makes terror-crime fusion possible and
therefore leads to a blurring of the line between TTOs and OCGs.

The first hypothesis frames the broad association between terrorist groups and illicit
drugs in a globalized world. Considering narcoterrorism, this form of terrorism is not necessarily
a recent phenomenon and the blending between terrorism and drugs can be traced to antiquity. For instance, in the 1000s a Persian sect of Islamists, called the Isma’ilis, went by the name Assassins which is a derivative of the word hasishiyyin—hashish-takers.19 TTOs rely on psychological and physiological manipulation to motivate their organizational base and ensure their operatives complete the mission. Administering a TTO’s participants’ psychotropic drugs prior to executing a terrorist attack is not an uncommon practice.20 Hence, Hezbollah eventually incorporating drugs into their market-structure is no prodigious accident, and the conventional academic wisdom is to assert both activities as one in the same. Yet, the deliberate manner from which a TTO uses an OCG substructure is what requires attention because a certain state-of-affairs must be met for the TTO to interrelate these activities. For instance, immediately jumping into the drug-market could backfire if the TTO does not take the proper precautions as it could make unwanted enemies; state and nonstate alike. The practitioners of both activities are what characterizes the respective institution’s makeup (i.e. in either a TTO or an OCG). Each organization aligns to the geopolitical circumstances needed for both TTOs and OCGs to habitually coexist. Both are entrepreneurs seeking hierarchical materiel and influential benefits based on defying the rule-of-law and harming others. The negative impacts of this relationship explains why a mutual crossover occurs. For this hypothesis, I argue three primary reasons why the relationship evolved between TTOs and OCGs. For one, both are arranged internationally
where the drug-trade adapted to the globalized market and terrorism progressed amongst
worldwide cell-networks. Secondly, both activities are revolutionary in nature wherein using
institutionalized violence is an accepted means to an end. Thirdly, and lastly, both activities have proven resilient and survive eradication attempts from national and international efforts.

- **H1**: Terrorist and narcotics activities thrive in a globalized marketplace.

To start off on the first point, TTO and OCG activities have persisted in a world where globalization is an accepted commercial norm. Here, liberal-markets flourish amongst capitalist, and noncapitalist, societies. The generally understood intent for globalization is to allow for a nation-state’s economy to integrate worldwide and then expand via the international exchange of goods and services.\(^{21}\) The effects of globalization have rapidly advanced technological, industrial, and telecommunications organizations. Innovative progresses developed the capability for immediate networking to become a global norm. The means for which organizations can transfer income has exponentially increased. Both TTO and OCG activities have correspondingly adapted to the globalization bandwagon in order to remain relevant and generate both profits and retain power. For example, let’s speculate a TTO primarily uses kidnapping, ransom, and armed robberies to gain capital. However, let’s say military forces and law enforcement agencies have cracked-down on this TTO’s funding tactics. Next, the TTO changes to a different illegal business option. Instead, the TTO diverts resources into corporate cybercrime, fraud, and extortion since it knows physically violent options were unsuccessful/risky. The military forces and law enforcement agencies now have to divert their tactics to the new TTO operation. Hence, the globalized drug trade has developed a supply-chain structure based on these adaptive changes.\(^{22}\)

Next, borders in this era of globalization are fluid and not necessarily the prescriptive physical boundaries as was previously thought throughout history. These international trade avenues condensed and allowed both nonstate actors and individuals to transcend territorial borders…Drugs included.\(^{23}\) The drug trade has transcended territorial boundaries to infiltrate the global market.\(^{24}\) In the *World Wide Drug Scourge: The Response*, an article penned in 1993 and as this globalization trend was in full-swing, the author cited political issues arising between the U.S.-Mexico’s porous border allowing drug traffickers to enter the U.S., nearly unhindered, and on the heels of the North American Free Trade Agreement.\(^{25}\) As a trend, transnational organized
crime exponentially increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s in tandem with globalization spreading across developing regions. The last time nation-states’ borders were rapidly challenged was after the Peace of Westphalia when monarchical regimes gave way to the rise of the citizen-state. Today, borders are defied again through globalization. Perceptively, it is more or less borders have taken a different form even as the nation-state vies to preserve its post-globalization political relevance. I contend the role of the nation-state is still important to maintaining the rule-of-law in this era of organization. Naim corroborates this observation regarding the current status of the nation-state in the globalized world with the looming threats of growing illicit networks. It’s not essential for a nonstate TTO to coalesce into the international community’s rational-actor mold. The TTO can function economically at the subnational level by taking advantage of these globalization inspired transnational drug networks. The TTO’s nonstate nature allows it the flexibility to choose which OCG market option best fits its operational structure. For example, the UNODC reported the gradual rise of heroin use (based on seizures) from 2003-2013 across multiple geographic spheres and continents: Latin America and the Caribbean, South-Eastern Europe, North America, and Eastern Europe (Figure 3). Correspondingly, this rampant rise in global heroin use relates to a marked increase in the use of opioids within the 15-64 age-range (Figure 4).
works in their favor. In the Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice Michigan Law Review article, this predicament in cross-border regulation is labeled the so-called “globalization paradox” wherein transgovernmental networks require a substantial degree of judicial coordination in order to prosecute a TTO.\(^{32}\) In this article, Hezbollah’s Sierra Leone network was cited as an example of a TTO which transcends extraterritorial jurisdiction because of the “globalization paradox.”\(^{33}\) Likewise, in the Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism congressional report, analysts reported Hezbollah’s transnational activity in South Africa.\(^{34}\) Therefore, a tit-for-tat exists where TTOs can continually shift jurisdictions as it sees fit to their advantage, and Hezbollah’s activity in Africa clearly shows it’s infiltrating destabilized regions to establish a geographic foothold. In the article Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, the authors cited an empirical analysis concerning the link between poverty and low education as precedent conditions for motivating terrorism. The study found that poverty and low education are irrelevant motivating factors and Hezbollah was cited as an illustration of this observation.\(^{35}\) The socioeconomic spectrum does not affect the globalization market a TTO infiltrates. Globalization diffused wealth into a malleable force from which TTOs and OCGs have adapted to international marketplaces in multiple regions, whether stable or not.

- \(H_1\): Both TTOs and OCGs use violence.

Secondly, violence is used operationally for both terrorism and in the narcotics trade. Anarchy exists because the balance-of-power is offset by competing organizations and from effective military/law enforcement operations. Theoretically, institutionalized violence is a means to measure realpolitik power. Thus, the realism concept aligns TTOs and OCGs towards this International Relations school-of-thought. As Makarenko analyzed, OCGs and TTOs have shifted their behaviors to adapt to a post-Cold War globalized world where on one end of the spectrum the OCG has to manipulate the political climate to secure criminal territory, and TTOs are incorporating criminal behaviors because state-sponsorship was not as definitive as before the Cold War.\(^{36}\) The loss of anti-communist and communist bipolar stratification after the Cold War meant dedicated state financing disappeared and TTOs needed to adapt towards crime to remain relevant.\(^{37}\) To these organizations, violent conflict zones are fertile grounds for their anarchy to reign. Violent conditions are not only imperative to deter legitimate nation-states, but also supports both the terrorist and narcotics networks which thrive under certain regional situations. For example, using MicroCase, we can observe a positive correlation between violent conflict (Independent Variable) and drug-use (Independent Variable) prevalence amongst Muslims (Dependent Variable) in Middle East countries with an Islamic political system (Subset Variables). The results are explained by the following with the \(r = \text{correlation coefficient}\), and the \(r^2 = \% \text{explaining variance between data-sets}\). These models are depicted by Figure 5 \((r = 0.195, r^2 = 0.038 = 3.8\%)\), and Figure 6 \((r = 0.335, r^2 = 0.112 = 11.2\%)\) with a full-table located in the Endnotes.\(^{38}\) Hence, violent conflict and drug-use in the Middle East region is a dominant market for these post-Cold War TTOs still remaining in the region. Opposing TTOs and OCGs are perceived as hostile to the nation-states which attempt to impose the rule-of-law over them.
Because imposing violent conflict is an option to increase a TTO’s vitality, this is a lucrative option when the situation provides the opportunity. Violent conflict enhances the TTO’s power projection to promote its ideology and implement aggression onto a target population. Although, from a legitimate nation-state’s perspective, there is a perpetual criticism of terrorism used to incite violent conflict. The TTO generally causes mainly fear and intimidation without exactly completely destroying the government of the targeted enemy nation-state.  

Next, an enduring trait of terrorism is that it can have global ramifications through mass radicalization within and outside the nation-state. Systematic radicalization within the TTO is what counterterrorist analysts have noticed since the latter half of the 20th century. As a matter of fact, in the 1980s, Hezbollah was a premiere TTO ushering in what was considered a new era of fundamentalist inspired terrorism; even predating Al-Qaeda. Another example (Figure 7) relating to the local intensification of terrorism with the presence of Hezbollah, from the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database, depicts the rampant increase of political violence based on 2,420 incidents collected from the Lebanon data-set (1970-2013). The observation we can make here is that Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon relates to the drastic increase in terrorism during this timeframe. Specifically, we can attribute this increase to the late 1970s and early-to-mid 1980s when Hezbollah was created. Also note, again in Figure 7, the exponential upsurge in Lebanon’s terrorism incidents from 2010-to-2013 correlates to the current regional destabilizing events in the Middle East (also, note the 2006-2007 increase from the Second Lebanon War with Israel). These include the departure of U.S. military combat forces with an occupation role in Iraq (2011), next was the following Arab Spring, and then to the onset of and continuing Syrian Civil War. Throughout these significant events, Hezbollah has been present and remains in operational control of their activities in Lebanon. Yet, the difference with the political violence in the 1970s and 1980s to today is that
Hezbollah has assimilated their OCG networks into their TTO protocols. This gives Hezbollah an innovative edge to continue their Shiite motivated campaigns in the region. Combine this new fundamentalist/violent extremism age with the previous evolutionary incarnation of anarcho-terrorism in the latter 19th century, and what results is a lethal concoction of low-cost weapons innovations, romanticized fundamentalist violence, and the means to finance these attacks. Illegal activities emerged into vast criminal economic subnetworks and have succeeded this trend. We can reasonably speculate the combination of these OCG market-structures with the prevalence for TTO violence in this particular region of the Middle East will persist so long as TTOs, such as Hezbollah, have the financial means and the operational structure to continue inciting and executing political violence. Thus, lucrative illicit supply/demand relationships have developed; particularly after globalization (as previously explained).

In unstable regions, the repeated occurrence and frequency of political violence opens a new market structure for TTOs and OCGs alike. In these failed states, both TTOs and OCGs share comparable corporate similarities in order to efficiently facilitate the distribution of illegal products and/or carry-out violent attacks. In *Dark Networks as Problems*, this was labeled the “Osama bin Laden approach to management” in merging these so-called secret networks into functioning lines-of-communication and trade:

As a result, the narcotics industry has adapted what might be called the Osama bin Laden approach to management: base your operation in remote safe havens, the more war-torn and chaotic the better; stay small and shifty, use specialized subcontractors or freelancers on a need-to-know basis; vary your routes and routines whenever possible; and most important, always insulate yourself with plenty...
of expendable intermediaries in case someone gets caught and talks. (Brzezinski 2002, 26).

The organizational configuration of these terrorist and narcotics activities dictates the structure of their institutions within harboring failed states. The terrorist represents a martyr to the cause whereas the criminal is materially self-interested. Nevertheless, a psychological temperament of the members to accept the use of violent force is a component of what makes up the configuration of these organizations. The pretext, and penchant, for violence necessarily dictates the OCG’s criminal and the TTO’s terrorist psychosomatic disposition. Therefore, the usage of violence to necessitate individual and collective gain is accepted in both OCGs and TTOs. Violent conflict zones are measurable events, and in this case in Lebanon and the greater Middle East, gives context as to why OCGs and TTOs significantly persist in this region.

- $H_1$: TTO and OCG activities are difficult to deter.

Thirdly, TTO and OCG activities have proven difficult to neutralize from law enforcement, military, and other nation-state methods. Unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral efforts at best contain the terrorist and narcotics threats. Counter-narcotics regimes and anti-terrorism coalitions have all attempted to abolish both these harmful activities, and yet both continue to persist even after the 1980s War on Drugs and 2000s Global War on Terrorism. An example of this was U.S involvement in Colombia to curtail the drug trade. In the 1980s, U.S. policymakers reasoned that Colombia’s narcoterrorism was a result of communist guerillas. At that time and up to the end of the 20th century, terrorism was viewed as a localized event which destabilizes only a particular nation-state. Nonetheless, since Palestinian terrorists conducted the first-ever successful “publicity” skyjacking in 1968, terrorism demonstrated it could spread like an international pandemic. Terrorism today evolved into a concept accepted as an internationally transformative threat. Terrorism crosses into the fearful minds of the disenfranchised and targets the unsuspecting like a disease. The individual terrorist is the terrorism disease’s vector and the victims suffer the consequences. The nature of TTO/OCG activities allows them to operate in the shadows and remain dormant until an opportunity arises to return, much like a cancer. On the other spectrum, transnational OCG traffickers have an endless source of personnel in destitute neighborhoods by, for instance, using street-gangs as future recruits. Since terrorism can be unprovoked and cause mass uncertainty at any given time, paying attention to Hezbollah infusing an OCG framework is important for policymakers in this new era. The world is now in the modern age of fundamentalist terrorism. Since the 1970s, a new generation of Islamic-militant TTOs showed they can strike at any time and place in their universal strategy to reestablish the caliphate (umma). Hezbollah’s doctrine has promoted the umma since its inception in 1982 when it was specifically created, following Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s Iranian Revolution model, to counter the Israel Defense Forces operations in Lebanon against the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Hezbollah’s jihadi role as an extension of Iran’s umma was part of the organization’s official manifesto:

“We are the sons of the umma (Muslim community)—the party of God (Hizb Allah) the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran.” Furthermore, the group is explicit in its submission to the Iranian supreme leader’s decrees, avowing its compliance to the dictates of “one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and
faqih (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions: [Aytollah] Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini.” (Counter Extremism Project, 2).

Ideologically, Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran is important in allowing the theocratic regime’s strategic policy to maintain their influence not only in Lebanon, but worldwide. Since 1979, Iran’s role as a regional power in the Middle East is extended by Hezbollah’s TTO international activities. Because TTOs are nonstate institutions, Hezbollah’s ability to transfuse across states and borders spreads Iran’s umma as a global initiative. The Iranian Revolution brought fundamentalist inspired terrorism to the forefront as a policy method to influence strategy. Shiite Islamic inspired martyrdom was a pivotal event from 1979 in Iran to the development of Hezbollah in Lebanon. This fundamentalist extremism is a global movement which Hezbollah projects on behalf of Iran by using their advantages of being a nonstate organization. Combine this with OCG activities, and Hezbollah’s survivability increases conceptually both monetarily and in maintaining an ideological support structure worldwide. As the ideological Shiite-front for Iran, Hezbollah’s nonstate composition gives it freedom of movement in the region and worldwide.

- (2) Survival Hypothesis – Movement of terrorist organizations into criminal activities is a result of rational necessity.

Hezbollah historically has a tradition of illegal activity. The methods, tactics, and procedures Hezbollah adapted to geopolitical and internal/external institutional circumstances relates to their history. This is a rational-actor characteristic where any means required are allowed to guarantee survival. Constructively, legitimizing terrorism acts to rightful policy is a case as old as terrorism itself in the Middle East region. Hezbollah’s transformation, to include a criminal-fusion model, is for this reason. Since Hezbollah has been well-established in their underground tactics since its founding, then OCG activities are merely a natural extension of their previous nefarious undertakings. Positioning itself at the will of the Lebanese people gives Hezbollah a populist edge while also executing terrorist actions to further political objectives. These actions legitimize Hezbollah’s cause. In 1980s Lebanon, Hezbollah started out as a terrorist organization then involved into a political entity. Then, Hezbollah transcended terrorism as a violent act into a perceived justifiable one since it is active within Lebanese politics. At present, illegal behaviors continue to manifest in the form of illicit behaviors and are becoming a distinguishing trait of Hezbollah. I argue four primary reasons why Hezbollah and illegal behaviors are conjoined to make this OCG/TTO hybrid transformation. Hezbollah’s previous illegal behaviors set the foundation for a criminal enterprise in the drug trade. The concurrent legitimization of it as a political party does not negate a proclivity for using crime and violence to stimulate Hezbollah’s policy. In fact, Hezbollah can employ both TTO and OCG maneuvers and authentic political functions not only in Lebanon, but also in global politics. For instance, Hezbollah’s leadership is not just located in Lebanon, but has cells internationally and is notably active in supporting Palestinians and Iraqi-based Shiite militants. This is deliberate on Hezbollah’s part to ensure its intrastate authority and legitimacy. In Hezbollah’s doctrinal playbook, the four observable power-based illegal activities, in a neo-Machiavellian means-to-an-end context, are as follows…

- \( H_2: \) Hezbollah and jihadism.

For one, Hezbollah has practiced illegal activity under the guise of jihadism since its founding and even in its transition into a quasi-political party. Jihadism, as an Islamic-
fundamentalist concept, developed during the Muslim conquests of the 600s-800s and remains a rallying-cry in both defense of the Islamic faith and/or the reestablishment of the caliphate to this day. Hezbollah embraces their Shiite version of jihadism to their own convictions. Resistance to outside forces is a central theme to Hezbollah’s jihadism and plays a role in its participants’ political activities. For example in 1992, Hezbollah’s establishment within Lebanese politics helped justify its armed militia status in 2004 to counter UN Security Resolution (UNR) 1559. The organization continually uses its political positioning to justify violent acts in retaliation for attempted UN interference. This Hezbollah-as-a-Shiite-jihadist-vanguard coincides with the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. Of importance, even before 9/11, Iran was listed in the annual Patterns of Global Terrorism U.S. State Department report for its direct state-funding to Hezbollah. Therefore, illegal behaviors as Shiite ‘jihadist resistance’ are a historical precedence and an accepted norm to achieve legitimate political outcomes. With the adoption of the JCPOA, Iran’s burden is to prove it is a rational-actor to live up to the negotiated agreements. The international community is trusting Iran will become an international partner in the diplomatic efforts to prevent worldwide extremist terrorist attacks as directed by jihadism. Hezbollah is Iran’s armed wing to promote the advance guard of the theocratic regime’s jihad against Israel and the West. The current state-of-affairs for Iran to maintain the provisions of the JCPOA is extremely important. The U.S. Treasury Department website documents all the previous historical sanctions on Iran, and now their webpage’s headline displays how the International Atomic Energy Agency will spearhead the effort for Iran to maintain the JCPOA agreement. Whether the lifted sanctions are directly linked to Hezbollah or not, as in the past with Iran’s open-sponsorship of Hezbollah, could determine the future of the JCPOA and Iran’s perception as a rational-actor.

The West and previous attempts to destroy Hezbollah have not worked because it has a myriad wellspring of illegal activities from which it can implement for their benefit/survival. Contextually, in the Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, ‘Terrorism’ and the Politics of Perception article, this combination of militant-fundamentalism and institutionalized Lebanese governance is called the lebanonisation of Hezbollah’s jihadism. Most significantly, Hezbollah’s suicide bombings of the Marine barracks in 1983 had clear strategic outcomes and demonstrated that well-coordinated complex attacks are deemed jihadist victories. Without detrimental reprisals, illegal activities are interpreted as a success which can be continually replicated and practiced. Hezbollah’s reliance on an external Shiite based support structure, primarily from Iran, allows it to operate unimpeded and focus on their terrorist activities; especially kidnapping. External Shiite-support to Hezbollah allowed it to make the ideological leap from a TTO, to a Lebanese based political party, and to eventually embrace OCG activities as another multifaceted approach. Whereas other TTOs may have to rely on organic internal support, Hezbollah has the advantage of being a frontline advance party for Iranian fundamentalist/militant Shiism. For Iran, Hezbollah’s strategic location is crucial to the Middle Eastern Shiite-Islamist balance-of-power. Hezbollah is a jihadist counter-weight to the Sunnis; even though it is geographically separated from Iran by Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. Hezbollah is Iran’s political proxy to execute aggressive policies against Israel, and it also provides support to the Assad regime in Syria (which is also Shiite). Recently, a Council on Foreign Relations article analyzed Hezbollah’s role in the Syrian Civil War and why it will affect its power in Lebanon.

- $H_2$: The importance of generational hierarchy in Hezbollah.
Two, Hezbollah’s leadership is comprised of a generational hierarchy. Hezbollah necessitates justifying political violence by imbuing a sense of pride and personal responsibility within its members, and this is especially important for selecting suicide bombers. Being a part of Hezbollah is equivalent to the sum of your ancestry and heritage in what can be called an intergenerational investment; regardless of socioeconomic status. Familial ties increase the likelihood that Hezbollah’s operations will be carried out and also minimizes the footprint their illegal activities can be detected. An example of this was in Israel’s “Operation Peace of the Galilee” (1982) when the Israeli army invaded and occupied southern Lebanon. In retaliation, Shiite-Lebanese rallied behind and/or joined Hezbollah and conducted suicide attacks on a massive scale. The family as initiator is not new given recent fraternal suicide-bombing/small-arms attack trends including: the Boston Marathon bombing in April 2013 (Tsarnaev brothers), the Charlie Hebdo newspaper in January 2015, and again Paris in November 2015 (also, fraternal-ties are reported in the Belgium bombings of March 2016). Hezbollah is no different and values family relationships serving as a motivator for specifically selecting suicide bombers. The brothers-in-arms term relating to these particular terrorist attacks gives a whole new meaning to the phrase. Even the December 2015 San Bernardino, California attacks were conducted by a husband/wife jihadist radicalized couple. Terrorism is a family-affair which can bring honor or disgrace to these TTO groups. Terrorism becomes a psychologically personal endeavor where dedication to the cause becomes the mark of self-importance. It also allows these families to form strong bonds to better evade counterterrorism surveillance. Hezbollah’s unique use of personal relationships, both in public and private, are transparent examples of geopolitical improvisation. The ability to effectively exploit formal and informal channels is not coincidental. This is a cultural prerogative where families are consultant figures in Hezbollah. The adage “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” rings true when scrutinizing Hezbollah. In Lebanon, terrorism is accepted as a homegrown means to overcome an external antagonist.

- \( H_2: \) Hezbollah’s TTO and OCG activities are worldwide.

Three, Hezbollah’s reliance on illegal revenue and financing sources naturally evolved into the drug-trade. The previously accepted Iranian state-sponsored approach overlapped into other funding opportunities and both are now seamless. For example the zakat, which in the Qu’ran is a religious tax, permits governments to contribute to TTOs as charitable causes. The zakat allows Hezbollah to not only advance itself as a Shiite political cause, but also the opportunity to distribute illegal narcotics most notably in the tri-border region of South America. Hezbollah has collected the zakat from their well-established Shia communities in this tri-border region in countries spanning from Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil. For Hezbollah, the drug trade is another vehicle, like the zakat, to guarantee operational continuity where cost-effective logistics/planning were already honed and mastered in the 1980s. The ends-justify-the-means activities needed to guarantee these neo-Machiavellian political goals is accepted to populist Lebanese and Hezbollah supporters’ perceptions. Integrating the drug trade as another funding stream is justifiable because it does not constrain Iran in having to commit zakat resources since Hezbollah can further provide for itself. Iran is another partner and benefactor in a mutual Shiite/jihadist policy agenda. So long as the Shiite vanguard deters the Sunnis and keeps the Israelis/West in check, Hezbollah’s international terrorist activities are viewed as permissive. An example of this was the 1992 bombing of an Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aires which was planned and ordered by Hezbollah.\textsuperscript{82} Hezbollah has the means, organization, and revenue to expand their operational range beyond Lebanon. Hezbollah uses these multifaceted OCG methods to intervene in targeted countries. Other methods, such as the zakat, are also available for Hezbollah to continue a stable financial base in addition to integrating these OCG networks. Again, since its inception in the 1980s, Hezbollah has become international and by extension is projecting Iran’s power and influence.

- $H_2$: No hegemon has restricted Hezbollah’s activity.

Fourthly, and finally, there is no hegemon to limit Hezbollah’s illegal activity. From a U.S. standpoint, Hezbollah is a paradox between the War on Drugs and the Global War on Terrorism because it can interrelate between the two. In \textit{International Relations in a Post-Hegemonic Age}, the author cites why unipolar strategic policies in a post-Cold War era, even if the U.S. is the sole-superpower, are increasingly more difficult to achieve in today’s complex/multipolar world.\textsuperscript{83} For example, in the \textit{Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism} congressional report, the analysts cited that Hezbollah operatives routinely utilize fake passports from underground agencies in Pakistan which specialize in making counterfeit documents.\textsuperscript{84} This puts U.S. policymakers in a predicament when deciding how to approach the problem between Hezbollah’s two operational approaches (drugs or terror?). Internationally, UNR 1373 was instituted after the 9/11 attacks in a global effort to prevent terrorist financing amongst member nations.\textsuperscript{85} Specifically, the provisions of UNR 1373 were a comprehensive agreement to dismantle TTOs financially, deny safe havens, and create the Counter-Terrorism Committee (among other widespread initiatives).\textsuperscript{86} Post-9/11, the worst case-scenario is Hezbollah (or other TTOs) acquiring a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). In the article \textit{Nonstate Actors, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction}, statistical findings from the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service analyzed 69,000 terrorist events from 1970-1997, taking into account WMD data including the use of “long-range missiles” and “sophisticated explosives,” and cited Hezbollah as a TTO highly likely to use WMDs if/when inventoried.\textsuperscript{87} Since Hezbollah can operate as a political party within a sovereign state, without national or international pressures, it can adapt to whichever geopolitical situation best fits the agenda. Being geographically separated from Iran actually works in Hezbollah’s favor because the regional displacement allows it an increased terrorism and crime projection range to function and operate.\textsuperscript{88} Another example of this is the bilateral relationship between Venezuela and Iran which existed even before the JCPOA. Both countries have agreed upon oil industry trade initiatives to circumvent Iran’s sanctions and increase oil revenue.\textsuperscript{89}

- **Analysis:** \textit{Hezbollah deliberately fused into a TTO/OCG hybrid as a result of worldwide globalization and to ensure their international survival = Crime-Terror Nexus.}
The final analysis explains Hezbollah’s transformation into a hybrid TTO/OCG due the hypotheses previously presented. Hezbollah transcended its activities to maintain their global influence. Implementing criminal activities allows Hezbollah to demonstrate interoperability not only with state financiers like Iran and Syria, but also with nonstate OCGs. Identifying the drug trade and criminal behaviors integrating into Hezbollah’s operational structure demonstrates that infusing an OCG structure is permissible. These are mutually inclusive relationships where Hezbollah will exploit any means necessary to advance its agenda. Hezbollah actively corroborates between legitimate and illegitimate methods to best influence their political message and ensure their survivability. On one hand, recognition as a Lebanese political party works in Hezbollah’s favor. On the other hand, it still applies illegal behavior as a means to an end which detracts from their perceived legitimacy from the rest of the world, but emboldens its position within Lebanon and amongst Shiite supporters. For instance, in Lebanon and according to the UNODC, Lebanon’s average drug user is higher than the average for certain narcotics (or for heroin about the same) (Figure 8).90

- Hezbollah infiltrated the South America’s and Mexico’s OCG networks.

Three current conditions have allowed Hezbollah’s illegal activities to rapidly combine with the narcotics trade. As previously validated, Hezbollah is willing to attempt any means to secure revenue. These three analytical conditions are as follows…Firstly, Hezbollah penetrated the South American drug-trade and is active in the distribution routes within the territorial region. It established an OCG network in South America which has taken decades to develop. Hezbollah developed a distribution infrastructure which effectively coordinates their smuggling routes with narcotics cartel partners. Hezbollah shrewdly analyzed how to integrate itself with narcoterrorist activities in South America. Naim observes these cooperative alliances as forming due to a diffusion of drugs into targeted economies.91 South America is, after all, where narcoterrorism developed in the 1980s War on Drugs. In assertion, narcoterrorism in South America evolved out of Marxist anti-
capitalist guerillas during the end of the Cold War and was cited as a potential problem in early policy analyses during the War on Drugs.\textsuperscript{92} A stunning image from a DEA (\textit{Image 9}), depicts a foreboding male figure dropping narcotics on the drug-users of the United States while hiding a bomb behind his back.\textsuperscript{93} Officially, the narcoterrorism trend was reported to the U.S. Congress by the U.S. State Department regarding the so-called “Plan Colombia” from which Hezbollah was mentioned.\textsuperscript{94} Also, in a 2001 Colombian Armed Forces arms smuggling and narcotics seizure, the authorities cataloged the illicit traffic from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (also called FARC) going to Russian criminal cartels and Hezbollah.\textsuperscript{95} Similar activities with complicit ties to Hezbollah were noted by authorities in Brazil. Except in Brazil, Hezbollah focused on black market piracy operations.\textsuperscript{96} Brazil estimates, based on a 2000 study, that Hezbollah (among other Islamic TTOs in South America) made approximately $261 million through money laundering and fundraising (i.e. the \textit{zakat}).\textsuperscript{97} Coordinating this trade route was achieved because Hezbollah was not deterred from pursuing other illegal activities outside of Lebanon. Hezbollah successfully negotiated with the South American cartels and completed this drug route with the Mexican cartels. This specific OCG relationship was reported in the Fiscal Year 2007 National Drug Intelligence Center report.\textsuperscript{98} In 2009, a former DEA Chief of Operations confirmed Hezbollah’s collaboration with Mexican and South American cartels in an interview.\textsuperscript{99} Thus, Hezbollah’s crime-terror nexus manifested over decades and the illicit networks are now established and are currently starting to get more widespread attention.

Since Hezbollah has all the advantages of a nonstate organization, the backing of Iran, and a globalized economy; Hezbollah can integrate on whichever continent it chooses as viable. In South America, Marxist anti-Western paramilitary guerilla organizations already integrated into the drug network and shares this trait with Hezbollah’s status as an armed movement. Next, as an already established TTO, Hezbollah interceded in South America and corroborated with these guerilla organizations. The South American OCGs in of themselves were functional offshoots of these paramilitary guerilla organizations. Following this trend, Hezbollah assimilated narcotics and other illicit activities into their operations/finances. The OCGs are systematized around the whole-of-the-drug-trade whereas Hezbollah uses the some-of-the-parts to interconnect into the criminal continuum. Practically, OCGs and Hezbollah share a commonality wherein illegal activities are an accepted medium. Since heroin is quickly becoming the most abused narcotic internationally, it follows that Hezbollah would trail the geographically dispersed drug-market in coordination with their cartel collaborators (\textit{Figure 10}).\textsuperscript{100} Both organizations were already using illegal activity as a policy, but the narcotics revenue manifesting between the two is what differs.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Hezbollah’s involvement in the U.S. narcotics trade.
\end{itemize}
Secondly, Hezbollah is vigorously involved in the U.S. narcotics trade. This rather recent phenomena shadows Hezbollah negotiating a drug smuggling trade-route with South American and Mexican narcotics cartels for it to fully realize their crime and terror hybridization. For example, two major heroin trade routes were reported by the UNODC. The routes go directly through the Middle East where Hezbollah is active both in Lebanon and in the region. These trade routes end up in South America, Mexico, and eventually in the U.S. The first applicable route displays global heroin flows easterly to westerly from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, through the Middle East, to southeast Europe, Europe proper, and then to the U.S.A. and Canada (Figure 11). In relation to this particular route, heroin seizures, primarily in southeast Europe, have significantly increased from 2011-2013 (Figure 12). The second trade route depicts the global trafficking of opiates, consistent with the first route, and also includes the trade links to North America and South America (Figure 13). Since South American and Mexican drug cartels and Hezbollah share similar organizational characteristics, with the U.S. as a mutual enemy and a lucrative narcotics market on an intercontinental scale, the likelihood both would cooperate remains high by comparative standards.

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**Figure 10.** UNODC ranking and prevalence of opioids as the most popular narcotic on a scale from 1-9 (circa 2013).
Figure 11. Global heroin trade route from the Near East, to the Middle East, then to Europe.

Figure 12. UNODC report on heroin seizures in tons. From 2011-2013, the seizures in tons increased nearly 8 tons.
Hezbollah incorporating OCG hybridization into their functional structure would be considered unusual behavior based on the previous perception of it exclusively as a regional Middle Eastern TTO. At the time it in the latter 20th century, it was accepted Hezbollah was a Lebanese isolated TTO confined to the directives of their Shiite benefactors from Syria and Iran. Observing the crime-terror junction where the two intervene means scrutinizing Hezbollah’s current geopolitical situation. For example, FARC re-oriented their previous paramilitary/guerilla operations to specialize in the lucrative drug trade in Colombia more so that, in fact, their previous political goals are being succeeded by their criminal activities. More recently, reports show the DEA predicts Hezbollah is using these South American and Mexican cartel alliances to support militants fighting in Syria, and it is laundering these resources through its legitimate Lebanese-based political body called the ‘Business Affairs Component’. The DEA’s “Project Cassandra” is currently targeting Hezbollah’s ‘Business Affairs Component’ to curb the flow of drug trafficking and laundered money which ends up being used to purchase weapons for use in the Syrian conflict. Hezbollah defied the traditional TTO behavior, by allying with these OCGs, prior to the drug trade and other illicit activities being on the radar of the law enforcement and intelligence communities. U.S. federal agencies and law enforcement entities are now counteracting Hezbollah’s operations and disrupting their cartel alliances. Take for example two recent DEA seizures. One was in 2013 where Suriname
associates (Suriname is in northeast South America) and Hezbollah operatives established drug smuggling operations. The DEA made a public statement concerning this particular Hezbollah-Suriname network:

DEA Administrator Michele M. Leonhart said: “Drug trafficking organizations and terror networks are joined at the hip in many parts of the world. DEA must relentlessly pursue these dangerous individuals and criminal groups that attempt to use drug trafficking profits to fuel and fund terror networks, such as Hezbollah. Alleged criminals like Bouterse and his facilitators pose a direct threat to the safety and security of the United States. Together with our law enforcement partners, DEA is dismantling narco-terror around the world and putting the criminals responsible behind bars where they belong” (DEA Public Affairs, 2013).

A second 2015 DEA seizure was in New York. Here, Hezbollah members were arrested and charged with terrorism for conspiring and arranging for the sale and smuggling of firearms to Lebanon by laundering drug money. With its South American and Mexican narcotics distribution routes established, Hezbollah can infuse itself into the proscribed cartel’s drug network. Hezbollah has successfully traversed any political and geographic boundaries to integrate illicit distribution and trade as an accepted activity. The transnational OCG dissociation between Hezbollah’s drug and illegal activities, being geographically detached from where it practices terrorism operations, is not uncommon to TTOs profiting from the drug trade. Negotiating between narcotics cartels and Hezbollah shows a degree of like-minded conformity since both need to associate in order to fend-off law enforcement and military actions. Hezbollah’s infiltration into the U.S. drug-market was carefully planned and thought-out in to tap into a vast market based on an American addiction. This example mirrors another report from Canada where the Royal Mounted Police busted a Hezbollah-based criminal network established to funnel money from carjackings, thefts, and bank laundering schemes for the procurement of high-grade military equipment. Now that Hezbollah has accomplished this feat, a new precedence has now been established where the organization has proven it can assimilate multilayered illegal activities to enhance terrorism operations and continue benefiting from the narcotics trade and other OCG enterprises. The best approach now for policymakers, before systematically targeting Hezbollah, is preventative now that Hezbollah has proven it can take advantage of the drug-market in the U.S.

- Hezbollah’s OCG institutional changes means including a criminal hybridization.

Thirdly, Hezbollah was emboldened to reinvent itself institutionally to incorporate the drug trade as a thriving OCG substructure. Hezbollah was using new ways for keeping their profitable underground networks to preserve forward Shiite-jihadist momentum and gain income. Hezbollah is unique in how it embodied illicit traits over time while maintaining their political self-sufficiency in Lebanon. This observation is attributed to Hezbollah’s founding spiritual leader Sheikh Fadlallah. In the Governance of Terror: New Institutionalism and the Evolution of Terrorist Organizations article, the author analyzes TTO market-based institutional changes (namely isomorphism and autonomy) in lieu of deterring counterterrorism operations, and from which Hezbollah was cited as an institutionally adaptive TTO. TTO and OCG
fusion is comparable to a government agency created to fulfill a specific function. Take the Department of Homeland Security, a political oversight umbrella agency created in the aftermath of 9/11 merging the functions of disconnected federal agencies. The intent was to focus the legal resources and information collection powers of both intelligence and law enforcement departments under similar missions and operations. Hezbollah is no different and fused within itself new operational functions except that these are criminal in nature to advance their political goals through terrorism. Hezbollah evolved within an embattled Lebanese nation-state and was capable of expanding their ideological framework abroad. The crime-terror nexus is yet another evolutionary survival trait Hezbollah includes in its doctrinal playbook to guarantee its power status in Lebanon and in other foreign countries. Inversely, criminal organizations which self-radicalize to become politically self-aware is the counterbalance to Hezbollah’s fusing into the illicit OCG network. The International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress article made the following observation. As an example, policy analysts cited an OCG with TTO characteristics called D-Company, refer to Endnotes #113, now operating as a hybrid-terror/criminal organization:

> A criminal organization can easily transfer this apparatus toward politically motivated ends. The result is either a truly evolved criminal-turned-terrorist group or a “fused” criminal-terrorist organization that seeks to develop ties with like-minded ideological movements. The use of criminal skills for terrorist ends raises the concern among some experts that terrorists may seek out criminals for recruitment or radicalization, believing them to be a higher skilled partner than non-criminals (Rollins 2010, 14).\(^{113}\)

Hezbollah’s institutionalization of the OCG’s activities has increased its longevity by implementing its policies into conflicted regions and failed-states. I agree with the Third World Quarterly, The Long War: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Collapsing States authors and predict these behaviors will continue for Hezbollah in the future.\(^{114}\) Foreseeably, Hezbollah will likely continue not only their criminal activities in the U.S., but go beyond the U.S. to other international markets. The era of nonstate terrorism, a new pattern where the organization is not reliant on state-sponsorship, gives Hezbollah the tractability to alter its course as needed and one in which the international community cannot unanimously agree upon in countering this trend.\(^{115}\) Hezbollah demonstrated that it can take advantage of the drug-market, and there is no reasonable doubt that it will not stop to look at other potential regional markets or illicit revenue practices.

**Recommendations – In this case-study we now understand why the convergence between crime and terrorism is so common today.**

In conclusion, the first two hypotheses were consecutive so the final analysis substantiates the findings of the previous two. Globalization and survival are existential factors which caused Hezbollah to incorporate OCG activities for two reasons. For one, globalization facilitated all the intangible factors Hezbollah adapted to in a post-Cold War world where state-sponsorship from Iran was questionable. Hezbollah’s trajectory to include OCG elements was in tandem with criminal activities increasing in more interconnected world. Secondly, survivability means Hezbollah acclimatized to their Iranian dependent rational-actor characteristics it needed
in order to maintain their *jihadist* momentum. As a proxy for Iran, Hezbollah necessitated using OCG activities to maintain this bilateral partnership. *Why* Hezbollah transformed from an Iranian sponsored and Shia-Islamic fundamentalist influenced TTO to OCG hybridization is dynamic. Chronologically, tracing Hezbollah’s evolutionary timeline from its inception in the 1980s to its current status today was important for analysis. Hezbollah has adapted throughout these decades given interstate forces, changes in Lebanon’s intrastate politics, and asymmetric factors. Naim references these increasing factors as “geopolitical blackholes” where these TTOs thrive:

Moreover, according to a commonly used definition, a nation-state has (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. None of these criteria apply to geopolitical black holes. Multiple authorities may exert control over the same territory, and inside geopolitical black holes the traffickers of illicit goods who are connected to large global networks have a defining role in economic political, and military affairs (Naim 2006, 264).\(^{116}\)

In *The illicit drug trade, counternarcotics strategies and terrorism*, the author tested three hypotheses, using multiple databases and found overall, the drug trade is a sustainable financing method for TTOs.\(^{117}\) Illicit funds are the fungible factor here; my intent was to understand *why* Hezbollah shifted its operational techniques. Hezbollah was able to adapt to the violent situation in Lebanon and also expand their activities to failed-states and criminal activities abroad. Like Naim, Makarenko calls this the *black hole thesis*.\(^{118}\) My hypotheses’ objectives were to account for *why* Hezbollah went from a traditionally labeled TTO to this crime-terror nexus. Hezbollah adapted to their geopolitical conditions in order to converge their TTO structure with OCG activities. Makarenko calls this the *convergence thesis* based on this type of behavior.\(^{119}\) Finally, in this research paper, the links between Hezbollah’s geopolitical locations and its relation to narcotics trade routes was demonstrated by the UNODC’s statistical findings and by using MicroCase. On one hand, the illegal drug trade is a harmful force materially. On the other hand, terrorism is an ideological force which cannot epistemologically be contained.

Both terrorism and the narcotics trade exist in a world where the rule-of-law blocks their progress while both TTO and OCG activities are constantly being hunted by national and international agencies (i.e. like the International Criminal Police Organization [INTERPOL] and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]). Extinguishing their nefarious existence is the goal, but other domestic factors should be considered. Tapping into America’s addictive narcotics underbelly is a clear indication Hezbollah can conform to global economic structures and OCG networks effectively, and that it will continue to do so for as long as necessary until the U.S. can intervene both on the homeland and in Lebanon. Hezbollah has an array of options to choose from in order to continue activities in Lebanon. Politically, this means Hezbollah’s operational and institutional capabilities could have potential ramifications on the U.S.’s international diplomatic and strategic policies. The ability for it to be both representative of the disenfranchised Lebanese and carry-out criminal and terrorist activities for decades are critical issues policymakers must understand. Extensive operational cooperation between the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, and Department of Defense is necessary should Hezbollah become a primary strategic objective for
policymakers. Open feedback channels between agencies is a cooperative approach available to prevent Hezbollah from interacting with OCGs. Unless a comprehensive counterterrorism policy is implemented, these hybrid TTOs/OCGs will continue converging and take advantage of these “geopolitical blackholes.”

- **U.S. Response**

  In retrospect, post-Cold War and on the threshold of globalization, predicting Hezbollah could penetrate the U.S. drug-market would be foreseeably difficult to predict. Since 9/11, federal agencies have all taken aim at countering the threats posed by TTOs and OCGs…Hezbollah, today, indicates an alarming and already existing trend that more TTOs will attempt to hybridize into criminal activities within the U.S. Today, the U.S. has to effectively manage its resources if it wants to deter TTOs, like Hezbollah, which have adapted to converge both crime and terror functions. In *Terrorist Attacks on Western Civilization*, the author makes four recommendations concerning U.S. intelligence policies as follows: freezing a TTO’s financial assets, torturing terrorists should be allowed (highly controversial rhetoric), a strategic policy of nonintervention (unless intervention for defense is necessary), and absolutely no nation-building. The aim for policymakers should be to inhibit both TTO/OCG activities *smartly and efficiently* to prevent TTOs/OCGs from even having the chance to breach into and mature within both illicit marketplaces and failed states. An effective policy which efficiently utilizes military, police, and the legal resources is the best deterrent to a TTO evolving into illicit OCG profiteering – with the possibility of completely destroying it. A marked decrease in either terrorist and narcotics activities is considered a victory so long as an increase in drug-use or terrorist acts does not create geopolitical imbalance in the region. On that, a regional U.S. focus is probably the most prudent approach for anti-terror and counter-narcotics policymakers and committees. Globally, the U.S. should continually work with international partners in a multifaceted approach whether it be with the UN, NATO, and organizations like INTERPOL, to methodically attack this worldwide TTO.

- **International Response**

  TTOs/OCGs pose a prosecutorial problem to the international community in this age of globalization. The analogy TTOs and criminal organizations are like a hydra’s head is true. If one head is cut-off, another rises in its place or fills the gap which was vacated. Collective international efforts and coalitions at the very least create a justice based narrative where TTOs and OCGs are discouraged by the modern rational world. Multilateral judicial networks, as recommended in the *Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice* article, are one method to coalesce executive authorities into a counter crime-terror fusion legal network which in turn deters a TTO from completely enjoying the benefits of the underground OCG globalization network. Also, state-sponsored and nonstate financiers may or may not be contributing to TTOs, in the way they invested in the past. A TTO’s ability to evolve its composite organizational structure makes the crime-terror nexus truly a dangerous and unique undertaking. Hezbollah has institutionalized a legitimate agenda to the Lebanese public as resisting both the West and Israel. Simultaneously, Hezbollah is guided by Iran’s Shiite directives and a conformity to cause through violent actions. Integrating into criminal enterprises is a natural extension of Hezbollah’s previous illegal activities as a historical precedence to increase sustainability and survivability. The most effective international efforts
(i.e. via NATO and INTERPOL) combats both TTO/OCG activities on a united front where the entire substructure of a TTO/OCG is targeted. A systematic approach aimed at all personnel within a TTO/OCG is effective because it prevents the TTO/OCG from delegating power between operatives. Comprehensively killing/apprehending the boss, underboss, middleman, and street-thug could all put the TTO/OCG in chaos when military and law enforcement organizations successfully execute and administer these international operations.

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Endnotes

1 Blin & Chaliand, Merari. pg. 14.

2 United States Department of State. no date. Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.


4 Naim. 2006. p. 13, 30. A powerful contribution of the former closed and state-dominated economies to the rise of global trafficking networks in the 1990s can be measured in human capital. The changes released into the marketplace an army of highly skilled, experienced, and ruthless operators who provided the backbone for the new criminal and semi-criminal businesses that soared thanks to the possibilities bred by open markets and freer politics.

5 Berry, L., Curtis, G., Gibbs, J., Hudson, R., Karacan, T., Kollars, N., Miro, R. 2003. p. 1. The reach of transnational crime and terrorism is increasing for many of the same reasons that the reach of legitimate business is expanding. Many of the regions discussed in this report are touched by criminal or terrorist activity from other regions of the world. For example, the starting point of arms trafficking in Africa often is weapons supplies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the trafficking of narcotics and human beings covers long distances from Asia and Africa to Western Europe and North America. Intermediary agents often are involved in transit countries along the routes. This globalization has brought about greatly increased cooperation and sophistication among criminal groups based in different parts of the world. In recent years, terrorist groups also have proven that their reach is worldwide, as they benefit from some of the same conditions that make nations hospitable to organized crime. Evidence shows, for example, that terrorist groups based in the Middle East have established connections in several other continents.

6 Rollins, J., Wyler, L., Rosen, S. 2010. p. (Summary). This report provides a primer on the confluence of transnational terrorist and criminal groups and related activities abroad. It evaluates possible motivations and disincentives for cooperation between terrorist and criminal organizations, variations in the scope of crime-terrorism links, and the types of criminal activities—fundraising, material and logistics support, and exploitation of corruption and gaps in the rule of law—used by terrorist organizations to sustain operations. This report also discusses several international case studies to illustrate the range of crime-terrorism convergence and non-convergence, including Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company; the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); the 2004 Madrid bombers; the Taliban; Hezbollah; Al Qaeda; the 2005 London bombers; Al-Shabaab; as well as known or alleged crime-terrorism facilitators such as Viktor Bout, Monzer Al Kasser, and Abu Ghadiyah. Policy considerations discussed in this report include possible tensions between counterterrorism and anti-crime policy
under various legal authorities since 1979, following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

Hezbollah’s loyalty to Iran and Syria has translated into Hezbollah involvement on behalf of the embattled Syrian regime. Despite its rhetoric of freeing Lebanon from foreign occupation, Hezbollah has made no secret that it is heavily supported by foreign powers, namely the Islamist Iranian regime. Iran has transferred mass quantities of weapons, fighters, and other supplies to Hezbollah through its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, using Syria as a transfer point. It has been responsible for transferring thousands of rockets, which Hezbollah has used against Israeli civilians, notably in the 2006 Second Lebanon War which was sparked by a Hezbollah cross-border raid that resulted in the deaths of eight soldiers and capture of two others. In addition to its violently anti-Israel position, Hezbollah’s loyalty to Iran and Syria has translated into Hezbollah involvement on behalf of the embattled Syrian regime in that country’s civil war.

In Colombia, drug lords have used graft and violence to undermine judicial authority, disrupt elections, and intimidate politicians and the press.

Organized crime of the drugs trade, of which Colombian narcoterrorism—the financing of Colombian guerilla movements through cocaine production—was the most violent form, has been used to relate to the formation of alliances between criminal and terrorist organisations. These two types of relationship constitute the major components of the nexus, as it currently exists; however, the relationship between organised crime and terrorism has evolved into something more complex.

Reviews of the literature on WMD terrorism suggest that there is a need to rethink what we know and to revisit the ways in which we are interpreting what we know. The conference on which this forum is based was an attempt to do just that. Nonetheless, it is true that we, as editors, left the conference more impressed by how much there is left to do than by how much has been accomplished. Thus, the contributions that follow should not be viewed as providing some sort of comprehensive understanding of the relationship between nonstate actors, terrorism, and WMD. Instead, we see each as a spotlight, illuminating one part of a complex landscape. This result is not ideal but, as was articulately stated by one of the conference participants, we may not have the liberty of slowly and methodically building a body of knowledge.

International and transnational terrorism was at most a nuisance, like organized crime of the drugs trade, of which Colombian narcoterrorism—the financing of Colombian guerilla movements through cocaine production—was the most violent form.

The United States has imposed restrictions on activities with Iran under various legal authorities since 1979, following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.
The Department of State’s Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation is responsible for enforcing and implementing a number of U.S. sanctions programs that restrict access to the United States for companies that engage in certain commercial activities in Iran.

13 Id. n.d. The following UNSCR authorized sanctions on Iran’s oil industry. These multilateral efforts were meant to diplomatically coerce Iran to stop researching their nuclear weapons program and bring the nation to the negotiating table: UNSCR 1929, UNSCR 1803, UNSCR 1747, UNSCR 1737.

14 Gootenberg. 2009. p. 14. The global trade in illicit drugs—worth about $300 to $500 billion in “street sales” annually—is among the world’s largest commodity trades, everywhere in tandem with other flows and institutions, despite these massive efforts at control.


16 Blin & Chaliand. 2007. p. 209. In the late 1950s, one of the most high-profile architects of the American nuclear strategy, Albert Wohlstetter, coined the phrase “balance of terror” in a 1958 RAND paper. The balance of terror is based on the principle of mutual deterrence, hinging on the hope that terror evoked by nuclear weapons will be enough to dissuade one’s adversary from using them. The confrontation (Cold War) played itself out through indirect conflicts of varying types, including guerilla warfare and terrorism.

17 Laub. (2015). International sanctions have taken a severe toll on the Iranian economy. In April 2015, U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew estimated that Iran’s economy was 15 to 20 percent smaller than it would have been had sanctions not been ratcheted up in 2012 and cost $160 billion in lost oil revenue alone. In addition, more than $100 billion in Iranian assets is held in restricted accounts outside the country. The U.S.-led campaign to ratchet international sanctions threw the economy into a two-year recession, from which it emerged with modest growth in 2014. Meanwhile, the value of the rial declined by 56 percent between January 2012 and January 2014, a period in which inflation reached some 40 percent, according to the CRS.

18 Browne. 2016. The Drug Enforcement Administration announced Monday that an international operation had netted a Hezbollah network using millions in drug money to fund terrorist activity in Syria and Lebanon. The arrests targeted a division of Hezbollah, a Lebanese militant organization, that provides "a revenue and weapons stream ... responsible for devastating terror attacks around the world," DEA Acting Deputy Administrator Jack Riley said in a statement. Seven countries, including France, Germany, Italy and Belgium, were involved in the operation, which apprehended four individuals. The investigation began last February, with the DEA saying that additional arrests were likely. The terrorist network was said to be working with South American drug cartels to facilitate the movement of millions of dollars in cocaine to the United States and Europe, according to the DEA statement. The DEA accused the group of using the proceeds of these drug sales to purchase weapons for Hezbollah for its activities in Syria. Hezbollah has sent thousands of fighters to bolster the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad.

19 Blin & Chaliand. 2007. pp. 68, 268. Some consider the Hashishin sect—the Assassins—to be another historical root of jihadist mythology. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century, the sect developed within the Isma’ili community, which practiced a type of Shi’ism prevalent mainly in Iran and Syria.

20 Id. 2007. pp.387. The demands of any serious operation preclude suicide volunteers being under the influence of any substance that could isolate them from the very things that make them valuable: situational awareness and the ability to adapt. Stimulants can make it possible to overcome physical resistance, but that is where the drug use stops.
21 Li & Schaub. 2004. p. We consider economic globalization as implying the growing integration of a country’s economy into the world’s goods and financial and production capital markets, following the convention in globalization literature.

22 Milward & Raab. 2003. p. 420. ...the heroin trade and the logistics required to produce the drug and bring it from Southeast Asia or South America to the main consumer countries in Europe and North America have been increasingly specialized and decentralized. The basic feature, however, is a chain of bilateral contracts; a group or a person will only know his or her immediate predecessor and successor in the supply chain. Moreover, these distribution chains lack exclusivity; individuals at one level contract with different individuals at other levels (Layne et al. 2001, appendix C). Although this is not a dense, horizontal structure, it nonetheless resembles the supply chains that are regularly termed networks in the business and management literature.

23 Gootenberg. 2009. p. 20, 22. Borders later evolved into an obstacle course, as drugs became categorized, outlawed, and tracked by expanding Western power during the twentieth century...The second level of explanation for drugs across borders is forced on dispersion. Once certain drugs became restricted or banned, starting with a string of international opiates conventions since 1912, they fast escaped to scattered zones where production could be safely concealed and pursued.

24 Bamyeh & Neilson. 2009. p. 11. ...to study the transnational circulation of drugs is to actively rethink geographies of globalization by focusing on specific types of global movements. We are more familiar with the displacements of migration, the movement of capital, the flow of information through communication networks. Undoubtedly, the passage of drugs is closely associated with each of these, and operates within and around the topographies they have established. But is also establishes a unique geography of its own.

25 Flynn. 1993. p. 37. Third, the smuggling success of drug traffickers may erode political support for a more open global economy. The case of the U.S.-Mexican border is suggestive. The almost 300 million crossings along the 1,951-mile border last year made it impossible for U.S. border patrol and customs agents to keep drug traffickers and illegal immigrants from entering the country. Protests have arisen from some quarters that adopting the North American Free Trade Agreement will only make matters worse. There have even been calls to seal the border altogether. In the end, the close economic ties between Mexico and the United States and the long standing U.S. commitment to economic liberalization will enable the free traders to carry the day.

26 Brocklesby. 2012. p. 419. For some years now transnational organised crime has been on a sharp upward trend. Most commentators (see, eg, Moore, 1996; Saviano,2 006) agree that the origins of this escalation in activity can be traced back to globalisation trends that began during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period that witnessed a significant increase in economic growth in Asia and other developing regions and a geographical freeing up of the movement of people, money, products and services.

27 Blin & Chaliand. 2007. p. 91. Since every country, in accordance with the 1648 treaty, was bound to respect the principle of “cujus region, ejus religio” (the religion of the prince is the religion of the people)—which had grown considerably more flexible since the disastrous Peace of Augsburg of 1555—each religion would prosper in all freedom within its designated territory. In contrast to the contemporary interpretation of the principle of noninterference, which views it as running counter to respect for human rights, the seventeenth century view was that the principle represented a great leap forward in that domain. In fact, the Peace of Westphalia put a total end to wars of religion and the campaigns of terror that accompanied them. The resumption of the practice of terror would have to wait until 1789.

28 Naim. 2006. p. 275. There are aspects of this that are not new. Sovereignty has never been absolute, and the demise of the nation-state has often been erroneously predicted. Nation-states are not about to go away and will continue to be the building block of the international system. But thinking about sovereignty without taking into account the termites that are chipping at it—or assuming that state power can neutralize their impact by building fences or electronically sealing borders—ignores a plethora of highly apparent warning signals.
29 Bamyeh & Neilson. 2009. p. 8. ...illicit drugs can have devastating consequences for human lives, but it is salutary to remember, in the midst of the campaign against terror, that it was frequently the state’s effort to empower itself, as well as its obsession with wars against other states (as during the Cold War) that brought state agencies into systematic and symbiotic relations with transnational trafficking organizations, often indirectly fueling the world’s shadow economies.

30 UNODC. Global quantities of heroin seized, by region and in selected countries, 2003-2013.

31 Id. Use of opioids* in 2013 (or latest year available).

32 Turner. 2009. p. 987. But the reliance on international tribunals raises obvious concerns about infringements on national sovereignty. It presents a particularly acute example of what Slaughter calls the “globalization paradox”- needing government at an international level, but fearing it at the same time. This paradox is reflected in current debates about the International Criminal Court. On the one hand, the International Criminal Court lacks support among key countries that have the power to make the court truly effective, especially the United States. As a result, the enforcement of the court’s orders, which depends entirely on cooperation by state authorities, will likely be slow and often ineffective. On the other hand, some of the most serious human rights violations will remain unaddressed unless some action is taken at the international level.

33 Id. pp. 1005-1006. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, for example, pointed to the links between Charles Taylor and Al-Qaesa in the hope of drawing the attention of U.S. authorities, which could provide more funding to the court and put more pressure on Nigeria to surrender Taylor. While the connections to Al-Qaesa have not been substantiated so far, there is evidence of Hezbollah ties in Sierra Leone.

34 Berry, L., Curtis, G., Gibbs, J., Hudson, R., Karacan, T., Kollars, N., Miro, R. 2003. pp. 25-26. Several international Muslim terrorist organizations also are present in South Africa. According to South African intelligence sources, the militant Palestinian group Hamas has been active since at least 1992, raising funds and enlisting recruits for military training. The Lebanese based Hizballah group allegedly maintains a presence in South Africa as well. After establishing a foothold in 1997, al Qaeda seems to view South Africa as a source of funds as well as a place of refuge for fugitive militants. These groups are aided by local radicals in the indigenous Muslim population.

35 Li & Schaub. 2004. p. 237. Recently, Krueger and Maleckova (2002) assessed empirically the link between poverty or low education and participation in politically motivated violence and terrorist activities. They show that the occurrences of hate crimes, which resemble terrorism in spirit, are largely unrelated to economic conditions. Then, based on a public opinion poll conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, they show that Palestinians who have higher education or living standards are just as likely to support violence against Israeli targets. Next, they conducted a statistical analysis of participation in Hezbollah in Lebanon and found that education and poverty do not explain whether individuals choose to become martyrs for Hezbollah on suicide missions. Those who have a living standard above the poverty line or a secondary school or higher education are actually more likely to participate in Hezbollah.

36 Makarenko. (2004). p. 133. Criminal groups using terrorism as an operational tool, and terrorist groups taking part in criminal activities as an operational tool, constitute the second component of the crime–terror continuum. Although the use of terror tactics can be traced back into the history of organised crime [16], terrorist engagement in organised crime to secure profits for future operations did not emerge as a serious problem until the early 1990s.

In both cases, however, the post-Cold War era exacerbated conditions and drove many criminal and terrorist groups to shift their operational focus. As a result, criminal groups have increasingly engaged in political activity in
an effort to manipulate operational conditions present in the rising numbers of weak states; whereas terrorist groups have increasingly focused on criminal activities to replace lost financial support from state sponsors.

37 Cornell. p. 753-754. Yet, this depiction no longer holds up to closer scrutiny, as 'many of today’s terrorist groups have not only lost some of their more comprehensible ideals, but are increasingly turning to smuggling and other criminal activities to fund their operations' (Thachuk, 2001: 51). The end of the Cold War drastically reduced the availability of state financing for terrorist and insurgent movements (Labrousse, 2004a: 72). With the bipolar confrontation gone, simply being in opposition to a communist or non-communist regime no longer translated into financial support from one of the superpowers or their proxies (Makarenko, 2005). The need for alternative funding made organized crime attractive to many groups. The international efforts to combat terrorism financing after 11 September 2001 are further pushing non-state violent actors toward organized criminal financing (Sanderson, 2004). This move is facilitated by the rapidly developing processes of globalization, simplifying transportation and communications (Harriss-White, 2002; Williams, 2000; Levitsky, 2003; Cornell, 2004).

<table>
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<th>Figure 3</th>
<th>476) %MUSLIM -- Percent of the population that is Muslim. (WCE 2001)</th>
<th>345) C.CONFLICT -- INDEX OF CULTURAL CONFLICT:0=NONE;1=LIMITED TO POLITICAL MEANS;2=VIOLENCE (TERRORISM AND/OR VIOLENT REPRESSION); 3=ARMED CONFLICT (STARK 1996)</th>
<th>347) REGION 2 2 = MIDDLE EAST</th>
<th>336) ISLAMPOL -- POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD (TWF 2001) Categories: Non-Islam, Secular, Const. Mon, Monarchy, Islam Rep.</th>
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Verne. 2007. p. 8. In this fact is a great truth about terrorism. There is no evidence that terrorist acts, no matter how cosmic in conception or how well executed, have any ability to bring down the order of an established society or its military power. Despite all the suicide bombings directed by Hamas, Hezbollah (the "party of God"), and other, smaller terrorist groups, Israel still stands. Despite al Qaeda’s attack of 9/11 the United States, its economy, political system, and military are intact. Despite the terrorist bombings of the London transit system in the summer of 2005 and the thwarted attempt to blow up flights from the United Kingdom to the United States during the summer of 2006, British society still stands and functions. War, revolution, and rebellion bring down societies and governments. Terrorism does not. There is no evidence that terrorists can more than momentarily affect a people’s evolved way of life. The 2004 terrorist train bombing in Madrid may have affected its national election and immediate policies, but it has effected no fundamental change in Spain as a democratic society. Despite the suicide bombings of the Red Sea resort of Sharm El-Sheik in late July 2005, which killed foreign tourists as well as many Egyptian citizens, the country and culture of Egypt remain.

Crenshaw. 2000. p. 412. An earlier and more violent historical antecedent of the conception of a "new" terrorism is anti-Western terrorism originating in the Middle East that is linked to radical or "fundamentalist" Islam. This concern dates from the 1980s and terrorism attributed to the Shi’ite Hezbollah faction in Lebanon. In the 1990s, terrorism using the rhetoric and discourse of Islam sprang from Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Israel, the Islamic Group in Egypt, the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, and most recently the Osama Bin Laden network.

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Blin & Chaliand. 2007. p. 96. The progress achieved in explosives technology during the second half of the nineteenth century gave considerable impetus to terrorist movements, which, by definition, engage in a form of low-cost struggle with the potential to yield a profit that is inversely proportional to the means invested and, often, the risks taken.

Brocklesby. 2012. pp. 419-420. services. On the supply side, this motivated traditional criminal groups to seek new opportunities, to extend their reach across national boundaries and in many cases globally. In addition, new criminal groups, often emerging out of what were national military and security services and warring militia in countries such as Mexico, Russia, the Balkans, Central Asia, South Africa and Northern Ireland, began to enter the picture. On the demand side, in both developed and developing nations, a seemingly insatiable demand for counterfeit goods, cheap labour, drugs, sex, body parts, online financial transactions, protection and weaponry has continued to gain momentum.
Covert networks have come together with warlords controlling access to resources to create commodity wars. These wars are fought over control of diamonds, petroleum concessions, and coca leaves and poppies, which yield narcotics, not for any real ideological or political reason. War is the only business open at the entry level to large numbers of displaced or simply greedy people in weak or failed states (Hoagland 2002).

Cornell. 2005. p. 753. 'the terrorist is fundamentally an altruist: he believes he is serving a "good" cause designed to achieve a greater good for a wider constituency [whereas] the criminal serves no cause at all, just his own personal grandizement and material satiation.

Verne. 2007. p. 4. The terrorist intends to be godlike, to break into the ordinary world of the terrorized as something from beyond. The act of the terrorist is not intended as the production of social order but as its inverse, the destruction of the social order of the terrorist s enemies. The intention of terrorist action is the reduction of social order to the original moment of chaos that marks the beginning of social order itself. The terrorist hopes that his enemies will lose the compass of their commonweal and approach a state of the war of all against all, that is, a state of individuals all seeking their own ends in sustained panic, in conflict with each other and their former leaders. Terrorism, unlike war, is not the direct attempt to conquer an enemy. It is based on the belief that the enemy's society is internally weak, and that, once terrified, its citizens will allow their social bonds to collapse. Terrorists hold that they possess the superior values that will allow them to succeed once they master the most effective techniques of destruction.

Morales. 1989. p. 153. The geographic, economic and social dimensions of the drug trade are enormous and growing, but the statistics which document this meteoric rise are difficult to acquire, vary widely, and are often suspect. One source, based on 1988 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) figures, estimates 6 million habitual cocaine users and half a million heroin users in the USA. It is believed that the wholesale value of all illegal drugs in the USA may be $25 billion, and the retail value $150 billion. Worldwide drug traffic may account for $300 billion, half of which is thought to enter and remain in the USA.

...anticomunist myopia and opportunism were two reasons why the US anti-drug effort was not going well in Colombia. As one specialist noted, 'the US government has rarely, if ever, accorded the drug control objective such priority that it has been willing to sacrifice all other objectives'. The drug war rhetoric which equated narco-terrorism with the communist threat in Latin America was whipped up largely for the benefit of the US public. Nevertheless, the political tide directing the war on drugs has become so powerful that a truly serious anti-drug enforcement programme risks being 'captured by its own rhetoric and effectively immunised from critical examination'.

In July 1968, by diverting an El Al flight between Athens and Cairo, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine launched what was at the time called "publicity terrorism." The Palestinian cause, born of dispossession, had emphatically brought to the West's attention.

Transnational drug trafficking enterprises thrive on setting up retail operations in the territories of street gangs. Gang members constitute a pool of malleable labor and entrepreneurial talent (especially accessible if they are coethnics) in neighborhoods that are potential marketplaces.

Toward the end of the 1970s, a new generation of radical Islamists embraced that ideology to justify the resort to transnational political violence, considered to be the only means of restoring the caliphate—a symbiosis of the political and religious spheres—and of reunifying the umma (the Muslim community).
Counter Extremism Project. n.d. p. 2. The Shiite terrorist group Hezbollah (“the Party of God”) emerged in Lebanon in 1982 following Israel’s invasion that sought to root out the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO had been launching guerilla attacks from Lebanese territory into Israel. Hezbollah’s stated goal was to fight “for the liberation of the occupied territories and the ejection of the aggressive Israeli forces.” Its ideology was modeled on Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s 1979 Iranian revolution. As counterterrorism expert Matt Levitt notes, within the setting of the Lebanese civil war, “the 1982 Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation of southern Lebanon created the space in which Iranian diplomats and agents could help fashion the unified entity Hezbollah from a motley crew of Shi’a militias and groups.”6 Iran thus viewed the rise of Hezbollah as an opportunity to extend its influence, cultivating Hezbollah as a proxy force, providing funding, training, and weaponry through Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the early 1980s, Iran reportedly sent 1,000 IRGC soldiers who “provided military training for the existing Shiite militia and helped from Hezbollah, a new, more radical Islamic faction.” In February 1985, the organization formally emerged and issued its manifesto. Hezbollah pledged loyalty to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s Supreme Leader; demanded the expulsion of foreign forces (i.e. Israel, France, and the U.S.) from Lebanon; called for Israel’s destruction; and called for the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon.

Blin & Chaliand. p. 221. Another watershed year was 1979, when the Iranian revolution marked the striking success of radical Shiite Islamism; its influence was both direct, as with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and indirect, facilitating the rise of suicide bombings by the traditional glorification of martyrdom.

Harb & Leenders. 2005. p. 191. We mentioned before that Hizbullah is the official representative of the wali al-faqih (Imam Khamenei) in Lebanon. The wilayat al-faqih doctrine was established in an Islamic government with Imam Khomeini in the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. We will not discuss this complex political – religious set-up here, but what is important to note is that the association with the Iranian wilayat al-faqih endows Hizbullah with a distinct religious identity, which is also translated politically. Hizbullah’s leaders strongly believe that the organisation of the daily life of individuals around the system of the wilayat al-faqih will assist the establishment of a collective identity conducive to a better society. It is against this background that the organisation of the daily lives of Shi’a by Hizbullah’s holistic networks should be viewed. The wilayat al-faqih allows Shi’a Islam to exist as a coherent system of government capable of carrying out its actions.

Id. 2007. p. 9. No society has a monopoly on terrorism, and over the course of history, terrorist acts have left their mark on any number of geographical and cultural spheres. The Zealots (or sicarii) and the Assassins, for instance, were active in the Middle East, which remains a haven for important terrorist organizations to this day.

Id. 2007. p. 280. In the early 1980s, as a nascent underground group, it garnered worldwide fame as a result of its very effective terrorist actions. Now, several decades later, Hezbollah is a full-fledged Lebanese political-party.

National Counterterrorism Center. n.d. Although Hizbullah’s leadership is based in Lebanon, the group has established cells worldwide. Several Hizbullah operations have been disrupted since Mughniyah’s death, including the 2008 plotting by a cell in Baku, Azerbaijan, targeting the Israeli Embassy there, and the late-2008 disruption of a Hizbullah cell in Egypt targeting Israeli tourists and ships transiting the Suez Canal. Additionally, a Hizbullah operation was reportedly disrupted in Turkey in 2009, and in early 2011 Israel warned its citizens of several Hizbullah plots against Israeli interests in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Cyprus. In July 2012, Hizbullah exploded a bomb on a bus in Burgas, Bulgaria, killing five Israeli tourists and a Bulgarian. The group also supports Palestinian rejectionist groups in their struggle against Israel and provides training for Iraqi Shia militants attacking Western interests in Iraq.

Blin & Chaliand. 2007. p. 265. Greater jihad refers to the spiritual work that every Muslim must do with respect to oneself—one’s own worst enemy—in order to abide by the rules of Islam. It is Muslims’ ongoing due to keep their religious faith alive and to act as true believers. Lesser jihad refers to the duty of all Muslims, by all means at
nuclear IAEA's verification implemented its key nuclear Day of the JCPOA. Taking steps necessary to implement their JCPOA commitments. 

On this historic day, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified that Iran has implemented its key nuclear-related measures described in the JCPOA, and the Secretary State has confirmed the IAEA's verification. As a result of Iran verifiably meeting its nuclear commitments, the United States is today lifting nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, as described in the JCPOA.

their disposal—participation in combat, financial assistance, or encouragement—their religion when it is under attack.

Hadb & Leenders. 2005. p. 189. In Hizbullah’s view, resistance is a mission and a responsibility for every Shi’a in his or her everyday life. Thus resistance is military, but it is foremost political and social: it is a choice of life, or a 'methodology', as recently emphasised by Nasrallah. The resistance society is the product that Hizbullah’s holistic network aims to achieve. This society serves to disseminate the concept of spiritual jihad, which is complementary to military jihad: 'The prophet told us: combat is a small jihad, the biggest jihad is the spiritual jihad. Both forms of jihad are essential in building a resistance society unified around specific meanings with which it identifies, revolving around issues of social and moral responsibility, and of commitment to a cause. Hence, resistance goes beyond combat and becomes an individual process, carried out through daily practices related to body, sound, signs and space, transmitting 'religious and community knowledge'. Resistance becomes a priority guiding the individual in his/her choices, more so a 'humanitarian and moral duty'. Moreover, resistance is a religious duty (fard shar’i) to pious Shi’a are expected to adhere to. Pious Shi’a are expected to emulate a religious leader or reference (marja’iyya) who defines the licit and illicit symbolic, social and material practices according to his interpretation of Shi’a rule. The pious Shi’a is said to be a multazem, which means literally committed'.

National Counterterrorism Center. n.d. Hizbullah has participated in the Lebanese Government since 1992. With the 2004 passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for the disarmament of all armed militias in Lebanon, Hizbullah has focused on justifying its retention of arms by casting itself as the defender of Lebanon against Israeli aggression. On 12 July 2006, Hizbullah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, sparking the 2006 war in which Hizbullah claimed victory by virtue of its survival. It has since sought to use the conflict to justify its need to retain its arms as a Lebanese resistance force. In May 2008, Hizbullah militants seized parts of Beirut. In negotiations to end the violence, Hizbullah gained veto power in the government and retained its arms and secure communications.

Blin & Chaliand. 2007. p. 257. Militant Shiism emerged simultaneously with the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. The dissemination of its jihadist ideology was related not only to Iran’s continuing regional ambitions but also to the mullah’s desire to weaken the position of the Saudis, considered religious rivals. It was reflected in the increasing power, in the early 1980s, of Hezbollah (Party of God), which considered a favorable setting for politically motivated violence.

Winer. 2008. p. 114. Prior to 9/11, senior U.S. policymakers had begun to recognize that terrorism was being funded through combinations of three types of support. Historically, the United States had focused primarily on states sponsorship. As of the spring of 2001, in its annual report on "Patterns of Global Terrorism," the State Department reported that Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan continued to be the seven governments designated by the United States as state sponsors of international terrorism. As of that time, the United States found Iran to be the most active, providing support to Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), with other countries engaging in much narrower categories of states sponsorship.

U.S. Department of Treasury. n.d. Implementation Day Statement – On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the European Union, and Iran reached a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. October 18, 2015 marked Adoption Day of the JCPOA, the date on which the JCPOA came into effect and participants began taking steps necessary to implement their JCPOA commitments. Today, January 16, 2016, marks Implementation Day of the JCPOA. On this historic day, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified that Iran has implemented its key nuclear-related measures described in the JCPOA, and the Secretary State has confirmed the IAEA’s verification. As a result of Iran verifiably meeting its nuclear commitments, the United States is today lifting nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, as described in the JCPOA.
Hizbullah’s participation in the Lebanese political system prompted a set of studies arguing that the party is becoming 'lebanonised' a reference to the process of ‘normalisation’ of its political activities and its gradual transformation into a purely civilian political party accommodated by the Lebanese political system. This process, labelled ‘the phase of political jihad,’ substitutes the notion of Islamic revolution with that of political accommodation. Authors agree that Hizbullah has given up its radical agenda and is integrating into national politics with a pragmatic strategy. The 'lebanonisation' of Hizbullah would be a change from the principles of ‘rejectionism and violence’ towards those of 'domestic courtesy and accommodation'.

Blin & Chaliand. 2007. p. 222. ...the 1983 suicide bombings in Beirut were the single most significant development in international terrorism, especially the two that killed 241 American Marines and 53 French paratroopers. These Hezbollah attacks led to the withdrawal of Western troops and were the most important triumph of international terrorism between 1968 and 2000.

Id. 2007. p. 359. Iran was looking to become an influential player in war-ravaged Lebanon. Indeed, the disproportionate press coverage accorded the kidnapping of a dean of the American University of Beirut led Hezbollah to make greater use of that particular brand of terrorism. Acting under assumed names such as Islamic Jihad and Revolutionary Justice Organization, Lebanese jihadists, over a six-year period. Kidnapped, or arranged for the kidnapping of, a number of Western nationals, including three French citizens.

Laub & Masters. 2014. Hezbollah is at a critical juncture in its political evolution. Its recent involvement in Syria has raised the question: is it a Lebanese nationalist organization, or a group more interested in protecting Shiite interests throughout the Middle East?” says CFR’s Danin. “In many ways, the war in Syria and Iran’s future posture in the region will determine Hezbollah’s fate. It could emerge from the Syrian war empowered and emboldened and able to play a dominant role in Lebanese politics. Conversely, it could emerge weakened, tarnished, and without a solid base even amongst Lebanon’s large Shiite community.”

Azam. 2005. p. 178. Krueger and Maleckova (2002) have used some survey evidence from several sources to document the fact that the terrorists from the Hezbollah, in Lebanon, are coming from relatively wealthy families, and have received an above-average level of education.

Blin & Chaliand. 2007. p. The Israeli army suffered its greatest losses in a war of attrition in southern Lebanon, in which, by using the weapon of suicide volunteers, Hezbollah took full advantage of the strategic asymmetry. From a moral standpoint, the Israeli troops were in a weak position. On one side, every effort was made to protect the Jewish soldier—a precious resource—on the other, human beings were being sent to their death by the dozen and were seemingly content with that fate.

Burke. 2015. There are many other examples, in different countries, on different continents: the two Kouachis who attacked the Charlie Hebdo offices in January. The Tsarnaev brothers, who bombed the 2013 Boston Marathon. The brother of Mohammed Merah, who killed seven in south-west France in 2012, remains jailed, although his role in the murders and the radicalisation of the perpetrator is not entirely clear. Fraternal ties are also common among those who travel to Syria, Iraq or other war zones, even if they do not turn to terrorism at home. Few travel alone: almost all make the journey with close friends or family members.
Azam. 2005. pp. 182-183. Assume that there are n potential bombers, referred to as agents in the following, who can invest an amount bi in bombing some target, at a personal cost. Each of them is linked to his descendants by some altruism, captured by the parameter 8i. In the case of the Hezbollah bombers described by Krueger and Maleckova (2002), descendants must be understood more like "nephews and nieces", than as "sons and daughters". They report that the terrorist groups reject for suicide bombing missions those who are married and have family responsibility, and choose instead young people about 20 years of age. This can be interpreted in two different ways: it may reflect the altruistic aim of the group's leaders to avoid the pain and sorrow that the remaining family would feel after the event; it might also aim at selecting people that cannot be deterred too easily from performing their action by threatening directly retaliatory action against their family.

Bustillo & Carlton. 2015. The shooters in last week's massacre here had been radicalized for "some time" and methodically prepared for the attack, the Federal Bureau of Investigation said Monday, adding that it is still sifting clues to determine whether the couple received assistance from Islamist extremist groups or acted alone.

Verne. 2007. p. 6. Suicide bombers may also be recruited by leaders and managers, who do not tie bombs to themselves. Such suicide bombers function in a manner analogous to the "mules" recruited by drug cartels to carry drugs across international borders. The drug mules are motivated by greed, the suicide bombers by a need for glory and seeming completion of a fragmented self, accomplished in a single act.

Moutot. 2016. Family names by twos, threes and even fours are common on terror watch lists, especially in France and Belgium, as security officials track their travel to and from Islamic State group territory in Iraq and Syria. To beat the tight surveillance put in place since September 11, these family dyads or triads retreat into their own small worlds. "It's a matter of trust," Sageman said. "You confide in someone close to you, naturally. And when it's a matter of getting someone to join you, the most logical target is your little brother or your older brother. It's the same thing with street gangs. Less brainwashing and indoctrination is needed."

Ackerman, G., Asal, V., Blum, A., Dugan, L., Enders, W., Franke, D., Gurr, T., LaFree, G., Lichbach, M., Post, J., Sandler, T., Sheffer, G., Sinai, J., Stanislawski, B., Steinbruner, J., Stohl, M., Wilkenfeld, J. 2005. p. 160. Among the organizations using terrorism that have links to diasporic entities are the Palestinian Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fatah-Tanzim; the Lebanese Hizballah; the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Islamic Group (IG); the Irish IRA; the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA); the Indian Barbar Khalsa International (BKI); the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK); and al-Qaeda. The motivations and incentives for insurgent and terrorist actions by diasporic individuals and entities are connected to their desire to overcome the inherent disadvantages involved in being "others" in their host countries as well as difficulties in their homelands. Thus, they strive to gain political and economic rights and autonomy in their host lands in order to actively cope with the repressive measures taken against them by hostile organizations, societies, and governments, and to achieve independence or autonomy in their homelands.

Banetkas. 2003. p. 322. While in the West charities may be regulated to a certain degree, the concept of charity in the Islamic world stems from deep religious roots, which are inseparable from the state apparatus. One of the five pillars of Islam is zakat (charity), a tax on wealth, payable on various categories of property, notably savings and investments, produce, inventory of goods, salable crops, and precious metals. The source of zakats the Qur'an itself, the primary source of legal and religious reference in Islamic law. The Qur'an sets out five lawful recipients of zakat. Of particular interest are those described as sabil Allah, which refers to persons engaging in deeds for the common good of a particular Muslim society. Terrorist groups have construed sabil Allah to encompass violence against non-Muslim Western targets. One analyst has observed that even socio-cultural Muslim groups that are not connected to, nor advocate, political violence or terrorism, create and preserve the "Islamic atmosphere" that is used by more extremist and violent groups. He describes the Islamist "Terrorist Culture" as a pyramid at whose base stand nonviolent groups that attract large crowds, and at whose head one finds the terrorist groups.
increasingly cosmopolitan city, Bangkok offers both the level of technology required for document falsification and prominent Islamic terrorist networks also utilize Bangkok as a center for false documents and passports. As an state of affairs that I have called 'contested unipolarity'. A world of one dominant and several medium powers seems more probable; foreseeable future that is equal to it, or able to rival it, on the world stage, as the USSR did for four decades, albeit from a position of overall weakness. A world of one dominant and several medium powers seems more probable; a state of affairs that I have called 'contested unipolarity'.

Berry, L., Curtis, G., Gibbs, J., Hudson, R., Karacan, T., Kollars, N., Miro, R. 2003. p. 121. Reports confirm that prominent Islamic terrorist networks also utilize Bangkok as a center for false documents and passports. As an increasingly cosmopolitan city, Bangkok offers both the level of technology required for document falsification and
an abundance of authentic passports that can be altered to suit the needs of terrorist networks. One report indicates that false documents are usually transported to Pakistan where they are distributed to Islamic terrorist groups and individuals to facilitate global travel. The reports also indicate that these passports generate money that is funneled into those same organizations. According to the Bangkok police, the groups involved in the purchase and distribution of such passports include al Qaeda and Hizballah.

85 Banetkas. 2003. p. 333. Adopted on September 28, 2001, Resolution 1373 is the cornerstone of the United Nations' counterterrorism effort. It also represents a departure for the institution. Adopted under Chapter VII, 3 it declares international terrorism a threat to "international peace and security" and imposes binding obligations on all UN member states. The Security Council's deep involvement in the United Nation's counterterrorism effort represents a new development. Hitherto, the general topic of international terrorism was largely considered a General Assembly issue. The General Assembly's Sixth (Legal) Committee had worked on several conventions on terrorism, including recently adopted conventions on terrorist bombings and terrorism financing.

86 Clunan. (2006/2007). On 28 September 2001, the UN Security Council passed a U.S.-sponsored resolution that obligated all members of the UN to act to suppress terrorism and terrorist financing. Resolution 1373 is in effect a "mini treaty." It requires all of the same changes to domestic legislation, denial of safe haven, and criminalization of terrorism as the 1997 Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the 1999 Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing. But since these treaties were not yet in force on 11 September 2001, the Security Council used its Chapter VII authority in Resolution 1373 to obligate all members to implement their provisions. Resolution 1373 goes beyond Resolution 1267 to require states to act against all terrorist organizations and their associates, not merely al Qaeda and the Taliban. This broad language reflects the U.S. determination to take advantage of the sympathetic post September 11 environment in passing much tougher measures than states would otherwise have accepted.30 Resolution 1373 established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor implementation and increase the capability of UN members to fight terrorism through the promotion and targeting of technical assistance. Unlike the 1267 Committee however, the CTC does not maintain a designated terrorist list (the United Kingdom would not support such a proposal) and it adopted a neutral profile to generate as much responsiveness from UN members as possible.

87 Ackerman, G., Asal, V., Blum, A., Dugan, L., Enders, W., Franke, T., Gurr, T., LaFree, G., Lichbach, M., Post, J., Sandler, T., Sheffer, G., Sinai, J., Stanislawski, B., Steinbruner, J., Stohl, M., Wilkenfeld, J. 2005. pp. 155-157. We employ two methods for discovering which terrorist groups are more likely to obtain and use WMD. First, it follows logically that groups that have used these weapons in the past both (a) have the ability to acquire them and (b) will be more likely to use them in the future. Second, we believe that groups that have attacked targets in countries away from their base of operations are also more likely to use WMD. The database identified seventeen groups that have used WMD in the past; among these, eleven, including three Palestinian groups, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Dev Sol, Hizballah, and Sendero Luminoso, have struck in at least six countries other than their own.

88 Rowley. 2006. p. 2. Muslim terrorist groups manifest themselves in a wide variety of shapes and sizes (Rathbone & Rowley, 2002). Some like Fatah, Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad are geographically concentrated and Culturally and politically homogeneous. These characteristics enable them to control the free-rider problem in efficiently supplying terrorism. Others, like al Qaeda, are geographically dispersed and culturally and politically diverse. The senior and middle management controls free-riding by decentralizing activities into small homogeneous cells and by enforcing the supply of low grade foot soldiers and suicide bombers through religious indoctrination, monetary incentives and physical intimidation. Terrorist groups frequently enjoy geographical protection and financial support from countries that share common Islamic, anti-Wester objectives but that desire to avoid the international consequences of overt action. Middle Eastern countries significantly involved in such behavior include Palestine, Iran and Syria with respect to Fatah, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad, and Saudi-Arabia, Pakistan, and Yemen with respect to al Qaeda. The relationship between terrorist groups and nation states is more complex than a simple sharing of hatreds. The insecure governments of certain failing or failed states pay
off terrorists within their borders to avoid destabilizing attacks on their own citizens and/or to encourage destabilizing attacks on their border enemies.

Neumann. 2004. p. 1. Venezuela and Iran are strong allies: Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicly call each other “brothers,” and last year signed 11 memoranda of understanding for, among other initiatives, joint oil and gas exploration, as well as the construction of tanker ships and petrochemical plants. Chávez’s assistance to the Islamic Republic in circumventing U.N. sanctions has got the attention of the new Republican leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, resulting in the May 23rd, 2011 announcement by the US State Department that it was imposing sanctions on the Venezuelan government-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) as a punishment for circumventing UN sanctions against Iran and assisting in the development of the Iran’s nuclear program.

UNODC. Primary Drug of Abuse Among Persons Treated for Drug Problems in Asia, 2013 (or latest year available).

Naim. 2006. p. 67. The diffusion of the drug business into the fiber of local and global economic life is much harder to fathom, let alone combat. Its political implications are ominous. Yet, more than any cartel, kingpin, or rebel warlord, it is this pervasive global mainstreaming of the business that the fight against drugs is up against today.

Marshall. 1991. p. 31. This reality is glossed over by the glib terms "narcoterrorism" and "narco guerrillas" advanced by Washington officials in the 1980s to justify more military aid in the "war on drugs." As Special Forces Col. John Waghelstein argued in a 1987 article in Military Review, a "melding in the public mind" of alleged links between drug traffickers and insurgents would make it difficult for Congress to "stand in the way of supporting our allies with the training, advice, and security assistance" necessary to fight Marxist guerrillas.

Id. 2008. pp. 90-91. An example of a recruitment image is the "Target America" logo (Figure 6), which depicts a gigantic evil-doer dumping drugs on a diminutive crowd of people whose hands are raised to the sky. Absent from the scene is the hero who would stop the narco-terrorist's assault. The poster is a promotional tool for the "Target
America” traveling exhibition, which draws audiences from schools, churches, and community centers (DEA Museum, 2002).

94 Erler. 2008. p. 87. The "Target America" exhibition website has opened with a towering assemblage of the post-9/11 World Trade Center wrapped in yellow "crime scene" tape. It has represented the dominant or official narrative about U.S. military involvement in Colombia (see Figure 4). Prior to 9/11, this narrative was the "War on Drugs"; after 9/11 the story merged with the "War on Terrorism" and became the "Global war on narco-terrorism" (Isacson & Vaicius, 2003). General James T. Hill of the U.S. Southern Command articulated this shift in a 2003 speech: "Narcoterrorism in Latin America is fueling radical Islamic groups" such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This was "fact, not speculation" (Adams, 2003). The official narrative on Plan Colombia was in the State Department reports prepared for Congress (CIP, 2001, 2006, 2007).

95 Berry, L., Curtis, G., Gibbs, J., Hudson, R., Karacan, T., Kollars, N., Miro, R. 2003. pp. 159-160. In 2001 the commander of the Colombian Armed Forces reported that Russian criminal organizations had sent 10,000 AK-47 rifles to the FARC through Brazilian narcotics dealer Fernando Da Costa. In return, the FARC helped Da Costa to move large shipments of cocaine from Colombia to Brazil. Prior to his arrest in 2001, Da Costa allegedly also channeled arms from Paraguay-based Lebanese importer Fuad Jamil to FARC and other groups, including Hizballah. According to another report, the FARC received a similar shipment of Russian AK-47s from the arms trafficking organization of Vladimiro Montesinos, who was then head of Peru’s National Intelligence Agency.

96 Id. 2003. p. 190. According to Carlos Alberto de Camargo, director of the anti-piracy program of the Brazilian Motion Picture Association, “Brazil has good laws on piracy; the problem is enforcement.” Officials in the motion picture industry say that a series of national raids by police have apprehended many small pirate operations without affecting overall trade. Brazilian officials have reported that the power behind the black market is organized crime and international terrorism. The Arab community in the TBA has been tied to the black market trade in pirated goods, particularly CDs. In a series of probes, Paraguayan prosecutors have alleged that pirated CDs were a main funding source for Islamic extremist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas.

97 Id. 2003. p. 193. During the 1999-2001 period, Islamic extremist groups received at least US$50 million from Arab residents in the area of Foz do Iguaçu through Paraguayan financial institutions. An investigation by Paraguay’s Secretariat for the Prevention of Money Laundering found that a group of 42 Arabs in Ciudad del Este remitted abroad, mostly to Lebanon, approximately US$50 million, apparently during the 1997-2001 period. It is believed that these funds were derived from arms trafficking and other illicit activities.791 Paraguayan Interior Minister Julio César Fanego estimated the total amount to be between US$50 and US$500 million, with most remittances in the range of US$500 to US$2,000. Brazilian security agencies claimed that the financial aid offered in 2000 by groups in the TBA to Islamic and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, such as Hizballah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad, totaled US$261 million.

98 Esquivel. 2008. This is one of the conclusions in the report titled “Accomplishments, Fiscal Year 2007,” done by the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), an agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. “Information from intelligence and investigations on narcoterrorism that we have carried out identifies ties between Mexican narcotics traffickers, [and] those of the Philippines and Colombia, with elements belonging to foreign organizations designated as terrorists by the [U.S.] Department of State,” the NDIC document indicates. Based on information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the NDIC document emphasized: “The results of 74 investigations of narcoterrorism that have been carried out by the Special Operations Division of the DEA document that Islamic groups present on the common border of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay launder money, sell arms and traffic drugs of the main Mexican criminal organizations.” The document indicates that the majority of the Islamic groups represented in South America are tied to the Palestinians, and that they use their earnings gained from relationship with narcotics traffickers from Mexico and the rest of Latin America to finance their causes. It identifies the groups Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestine Liberation Front, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine as the Arab associates of narcotrafficking cartels from Mexico. “Groups like Hezbollah and Hamas,” it states, “have trafficked large amounts of heroin and cocaine in Europe and the Middle East sold to them by narcotics traffickers of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Brazil.” And it adds: “Furthermore, these terrorist groups have established multimillion dollar contracts in order to sell weapons to Mexican and Colombian narcotics traffickers,” that are commercialized by “criminal providers from Yemen, Kuwait, Syria, Argentina, Brazil and Bulgaria.”

Join Together Staff. 2009. There have been no confirmed cases of Lebanon-based Islamist group Hezbollah moving terrorists across the Mexico border to carry out attacks in the United States, but a former DEA official says that the group is working with Mexican drug cartels and has already used their smuggling routes to get supporters into the U.S., the Washington Times reported March 27. Michael Braun, recently retired assistance administrator and chief of operations as the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), said that Hezbollah relied on the same criminal weapons smugglers, document traffickers and transportation experts as the drug cartels.” “They work together,” Braun said. “They rely on the same shadow facilitators. One way or another, they are all connected. They’ll leverage those relationships to their benefit, to smuggle contraband and humans into the U.S.; in fact, they already are [smuggling].”

UNODC. Ranking of opioids in order of prevalence, 2013 (or latest year available back to 2009).

Id. Global heroin flows from Asian points of origin.


Id. Main global trafficking glows of opiates.

Ackerman, G., Asal, V., Blum, A., Dugan, L., Enders, W., Franke, D., Gurr, T., LaFree, G., Lichbach, M., Post, J., Sandler, T., Sheffer, G., Sinai, J., Stanislawski, B., Steinbruner, J., Stohl, M., Wilkenfeld, J. 2005. p. 158. Not all so-called terrorists, however, operate on the basis of political, ideological, religious, or ethnic goals. Not anymore, anyway. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), for example, used to be a politically motivated guerrilla organization. Presently it profits from drug trafficking; the organization benefits monetarily from this enterprise and is unlikely to give such activity up easily. Its members have always acted criminally in order to support themselves financially; ransom-motivated hostage-taking was and still is a significant part of the FARC funding.

King. 2016. The DEA accused Hezbollah of allegedly using drug money to finance their allied factions in the the Syrian conflict. The organization has sent soldiers to bolster Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime throughout the conflict. The terrorist organization has reportedly forged relationships with South American drug traffickers to finance its operations. In an international trade system known as the Black Market Peso Exchange, Hezbollah profits from the drug trade by covertly laundering drug revenue. “These drug trafficking and money laundering schemes utilized by the Business Affairs Component [of Hezbollah] provide a revenue and weapons stream for an international terrorist organization responsible for devastating terror attacks around the world,” commented Riley.

Reid. 2016. U.S. government officials allege the group’s External Security Organization Business Affairs Component (BAC) is involved in international drug trafficking and money laundering, and that the proceeds are used to purchase weapons for Hezbollah’s activities in Syria. The Shiite Muslim Hezbollah, classed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, has been one of Syrian dictator Bashar Assad’s most valuable allies over the course of the five-year war in his country. “Project Cassandra” targets Hezbollah’s global network that supplies drugs to the U.S. and Europe and is part of DEA’s efforts to disrupt efforts by terror organizations to fund activities through the sale of illegal drugs. According to the DEA, members of Hezbollah’s BAC have established business relationships with South American drug cartels that supply cocaine to the European and U.S. drug markets and then launder he proceeds. Over the past year, the DEA has uncovered what it describes as an "intricate network of money couriers" who collect and transport millions of dollars in drug proceeds from Europe to the Middle East.
In 2013, Bouterse used his position to assist individuals he believed were members of Hezbollah. In exchange for a multimillion-dollar pay-off, Bouterse agreed to allow large numbers of purported Hezbollah operatives to use Suriname as a permanent base for, among other things, attacks on American targets. In furtherance of his efforts to assist Hezbollah, Bouterse supplied a false Surinamese passport for the purpose of making clandestine travel easier, including travel to the United States; began determining which heavy weapons he might provide to Hezbollah; and indicated how Hezbollah operatives, supplied with a Surinamese cover story, might enter the United States.

Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York. Earlier today, Iman Kobeissi, also known as “Iman Kobeissu” and “Iman Kobeissi-Ghadry,” was arraigned at the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, New York, on money laundering conspiracy charges and unlicensed firearms dealing conspiracy for laundering funds she believed to be drug money, and for arranging for the sale of thousands of firearms, including military assault rifles, machine guns, and sniper rifles, to criminal groups in Iran and Lebanon, including Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization. [1] Kobeissi was arrested yesterday in Atlanta, Georgia. An indictment was also unsealed today against Joseph Asmar, an alleged Hezbollah associate who is charged with money laundering conspiracy. Asmar, Kobeissi’s alleged co-conspirator, was arrested in Paris, France, on a provisional arrest warrant issued from the Eastern District of New York.

A wide array of terrorist movements commonly are alleged to have engaged in the illicit drug trade: the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK); Hezbollah; the Filipino Abu Sayyaf movement; various Protestant Paramilitaries and Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) dissidents in Northern Ireland; the Indian separatist United Liberation Front of Assam; the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso; and of course the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC (Baruah 1994; Bibes 2001; Filler 2002; Makarenko 2004; Roth and Sever 2007; Silke 2000). One study estimates that the FARC movement derives Approximately 50% of its operating revenue from coca production and cocaine trafficking (Rangel 1998). In some of these cases, local drug markets finance terrorist activity. However, scholars note that the illicit drugs and terrorism nexus has a prominent transnational dimension as well. Profits extracted from drug production and trafficking in one country helps to finance domestic terrorism in other countries far removed from the drug trade as well as transnational attacks (see Masciandaro 2004).

Specialist groups operating in Canada generate funds from activities such as drug trafficking and arms smuggling, as well as through charitable donations. Islamic terrorist groups have engaged in both petty crime and organized criminal ventures to raise funds. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police has determined, for example, that profits from a number of auto theft rings in Ontario and Quebec have gone to support the Lebanese terrorist group Hizballah. Specific instances of crime in Canada supporting terrorist activities have been documented. In October 2002, the National Post reported that the CSIS had determined that Hizballah had laundered of tens of thousands of dollars through Canadian banks, while drawing on the accounts to shop for military equipment.

In the end, only the Lebanese-based Hezbollah has endured, thanks to its leader Sheikh Fadlallah, who transformed it into an autonomous body. The “Party of God” has changed considerably since its founding as a result of Israel’s 1982 invasion of south Lebanon, or “Operation Peace of the Galilee.” In the early 1980s, as a nascent underground group, it garnered worldwide fame as a result of its very effective terrorist actions. Now, several decades later, Hezbollah is a full-fledged Lebanese political party, with representatives in the legislature and its own army. Its success in getting the Israelis to leave southern Lebanon was largely due to its capacity to attack Israel’s army and people, in particular through the newly developed tactic of suicide bombings.
Terror groups that require a nonmarket structure have adopted common (and perhaps better) procedures in the hopes of minimizing the costs involved with bureaucracy and confounding counterterrorism officials. There is evidence of these patterns across groups and functions. Both Hezbollah (Harik 2005) and Hamas (Levitt 2004) have ostensibly benefited from organizing themselves into military, political, and social wings that perpetuate terrorist acts, participate in government, and provide social services.

Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company, a 5,000-member criminal syndicate operating mostly in Pakistan, India, and the United Arab Emirates, provides an example of the criminal-terrorism “fusion” model. The U.S. Department of Treasury designated Ibrahim as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224 in October 2003. In June 2006, President George W. Bush designated him, as well as his D-Company organization, as a Significant Foreign Narcotics Trafficker under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (hereafter “Kingpin Act”). D-Company is reportedly involved in several criminal activities, including extortion, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and contract killing.

States traditionally have been seen as the sponsors of terrorism. International focus has been on pressuring states seen to be directing or supporting violent organizations. Countries have long been divided ideologically over the political motivations of such organizations, such as the Nicaraguan contras, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish Republic Army, Hamas, and Hezbollah. As a result, states have been unwilling to define specifically what constitutes terrorism. This lack of consensus has resulted in a host of UN treaties dealing with particular terrorist acts (such as hijackings and political assassinations) rather than with terrorism in general. UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and treaties authorizing economic sanctions (and unilateral U.S. military strikes) were used to persuade state sponsors such as Libya and Sudan to stop their support for terrorism.

A crucial factor—and one that gives black holes much of their potency—is their specialized connectedness with bright spots. A remote, primitive, and badly governed—or ungoverned—region is not a geopolitical black hole unless it can radiate threats to places far away. The trading networks that operate internationally serve as channels through which these threats move from remote locations to the rest of the world.

The results of all negative binomial models support the three hypotheses in the study, suggesting that the international trade in and production of illicit opiates and cocaine is a sustaining force for terrorism while actions to halt the cultivation and distribution of opiates and cocaine both reduce terrorism...
7 Conclusion

The results of the models find that illicit drug prices, illicit drug crop cultivation and drug eradication and interdiction strategies are significant predictors of domestic and international terrorism, and that the relationship is robust to multiple specifications. These results seem to be consistent with the argument that addressing the illicit drug trade, using commonplace, though controversial, counternarcotics strategies, will yield security benefits vis-à-vis the threat posed by terrorism. By depriving terrorist groups of the substantial source of financial wherewithal that the illegal narcotics trade provides, and by improving policing and government control over geographic areas used for growing drug crops and trafficking, across borders, drug products, counterterrorism officials can hope to see a reduction of both international and domestic terrorist activity.

118 Makarenko. 2004. P. 138. This section of the crime–terror continuum specifically refers to the situations in which weak or failed states foster the convergence between transnational organised crime and terrorism, and ultimately create a safe haven for the continued operations of convergent groups. The ‘black hole’ syndrome encompasses two situations: first, where the primary motivations of groups engaged in a civil war evolves from a focus on political aims to a focus on criminal aims; second, it refers to the emergence of a ‘black hole’ state—a state successfully taken over by a hybrid group as outlined in the previous section. What these two scenarios have in common, and the reason why they perfectly illustrate the most extreme point along the continuum, is that they reveal the ultimate danger of the convergence between these two threats: the creation or promotion of a condition of civil (or regional) war to secure economic and political power. States that fall within this category, as a result of current or past experiences, include Afghanistan, Angola, Myanmar, North Korea, Sierra Leone, and Tajikistan. Furthermore, areas in Pakistan (the Northwest Frontier Province), Indonesia and Thailand—where government control is extremely weak—are also in danger of succumbing to the ‘black hole’ syndrome.

119 Id. p. 135. The final point occupying the crime–terror continuum is the ‘convergence thesis’, which refers explicitly to the idea that criminal and terrorist organisations could converge into a single entity that initially displays characteristics of both groups simultaneously; but has the potential to transform itself into an entity situated at the opposite end of the continuum from which it began. Transformation thus occurs to such a degree ‘that the ultimate aims and motivations of the organisation have actually changed. In these cases, the groups no longer retain the defining points that had hitherto made them a political or criminal group’ [29]. In its most basic form, the convergence thesis includes two independent, yet related, components. First, it incorporates criminal groups that display political motivations; and second, it refers to terrorist groups who are equally interested in criminal profits, but ultimately begin to use their political rhetoric as a facade solely for perpetrating criminal activities.

120 Rowley. 2006. p. 5. In such circumstances, what can the United States, the world’s only super-power do to Minimize the risk of terrorist attacks on its citizens and their properties? Four interrelated policies are best suited to dealing with al Qaeda-type organizations. First, the US should establish a first-rate intelligence and fast-response system designed to suffocate terrorist attacks before they occur and to minimize the damage should one slip through the net. One benefit of September 11, 2001 was recognition of the out dated nature of the US intelligence agencies in the post-Soviet era. Second, The United States should identify all major donors to terrorist organizations, freeze all their assets and send special forces to terminate the individuals involved before they can do further harm. It is especially important to frighten the well-endowed Saudi-Arabian Wahhabists who are currently funding much of al-Qaeda’s operations, and to raise the stakes against those members of the Pakistani and other Middle Eastern governments who are currently shielding the al Qaeda leadership from arrest and termination. Third, the United States should ignore politically correct objections to torturing and otherwise penalizing captured terrorists. Such Punishment is essential both as a means of extracting information and of deterring the more easily intimidated would-be terrorists from exposing themselves to such risks. Terrorists, it should be remembered are not only sub-human, but sub-animal...Fourth, and most important, the United States is well-advised to forego its imperial mission in nation-building and to withdraw its military entirely to its own
boundaries. By adopting a strict policy of non-intervention save only in its own most important, and unambiguously articulated economic interests, by withdrawing all financial aid and military support from all nations, subject only to the same exception, and by opening its borders to unilateral free trade, the United States would serve its own citizens well by reducing their exposure to terrorism while raising their living standards.

121 Turner. p. 1031-1032. First, networks can help domestic authorities build up capacity to prosecute international crimes. Second, when making and enforcing international rules, networks are likely to be more responsible to domestic political views and more democratically accountable that are centralized institutions such as the ICC. Third, by empowering local judges, prosecutors, and investigators who are committed to international criminal law, networks may be able to nudge even reluctant governments toward more consistent enforcement of the law.